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ABSTRACT
Combat Rescue Operations have been conducted by the United States
without much success since the Civil War. Using a comparative, analytical
case study approach, this study attempts to empirically demonstrate that
there are, or are not, common cross-cutting causal variables which operate
in widely divergent cases. Three cases are identified for examination:
the rescue attempt into North Vietnam in 1970 - Son Tay: the rescue
attempt of a merchant marine crew and ship in 1975 - Mayaguez; and the
rescue attempt of U.S. embassy personnel in 1980 - Iran.
Ten key variables were identified in the analytical model and were
grouped into five hypotheses, defined, and then applied to and tested
against each of the three cases. The variables were assigned a "rating"
(high, medium, low) based upon: (a) the minimum acceptable determination
that they were operative in the cases; and, (b) the degree to which the
variables contributed to or detracted from the success/failure of the
operation. The variables were: assessment, command, control, communica-
tions, speed, surprise, security, force selection, force training, and
transportation.
The results of the study indicate that all ten variables operated in
each case in clearly identifiable ways. There appears to be a strong
relationship between successful overall outcomes and both the presence of
a high degree of performance within each variable, and the number of high
ranking variables which were operative in the cases. These results are
potentially useful to policy and decision makers who are concerned with
assessing, planning, training and executing Combat Rescue Operations.
Two major conclusions are derived. First, °there are indeed cross-cutting,
common, causal variables which can be identified, defined, examined,
applied, and reliably tested against widely differing cases. Second, there
are numerous lessons which can be derived from the examination of the
cases and variables; and which are potentially useful in the preparation
for, and conduct of, future similar operations.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. William Kaufmann
Title: Professor of Political Science
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND METHOD
INTRODUCTION
Except in the Civil War, despite scores of
tries, there had never been a successful
rescue of prisoners .,, during all the years
of America's military history.,
This statement reflects the reality of the surprising and disappoint-
ing performance of the United States in the conduct of combat rescue
operations, The proud military tradition of the U.S. armed forces is some-
what tarnished by the lack of even a single "success" when measured in
terms of the rescue of hostages or prisoners from foreign captors. Why
this is so poses an intriguing question. The existing answers are spotty
and conflicting. A deeper question, supported by a systematic analysis of
the problem, might ask: "What have we learned from these operations?"
These questions' and the record of performance were the motivating forces
for this study,
Combat rescue operations are distinguished from other types of
"rescue"', "police", and "special" operations in that they generally: (1)
are conducted across the borders of unfriendly nations and involve rescues
within those nations; (2) are extremely complex with multiphased plans aiLd
numerous problem areas; and, (3) are conducted under hostile fire or combat
conditions.2 A situation or crisis which necessitates this course of
action presents unique problems in the areas of assessment, training, and
execution. But there are also important considerations and ramifications
in the political and diplomatic spheres, These issues and their importance
will be discussed in the sections which follow.
Purpose
This study will examine the cases of recent history related to the
U.S. military response to prisoner/hostage situations. The purpose of this
comparative case study approach is to examine the operational aspects of
combat rescue operations conducted by the United States from 1970 to 1980,
and to attempt to discover whether or not there are recurring phenomena
or causal factors which influence the outcomes, The study is relevant to
defense analyses and studies because the identification of recurring,
measurable and causal variables can benefit decision makers, planners and
participants, The knowledge of the existence and importance of these
phenomena can directly influence decisions whose ultimate purpose is to
maximize the probability of success (and conversely, minimize the prob-
ability of failure).
The major cases that are examined are: CASE ONE - the Son Tay prison-
er-of-war rescue attempt into North Vietnam in 1970; CASE TWO - the S,S.
Mayaguez crew rescue attempt near the coast of Cambodia in 1975; and,
CASE THREE - the Iran rescue attempt in 1980. These three cases are unique
in many respects, However, this author believes that there are critical
variables which transcend the superficial differences among the cases and
which help to explain the outcomes of these operations. The method of
"structured and focused" comparison suggested by Alexander L, George, is a
useful method of analysis through which the common causal factors can be
identified and examined.3 The specific method for this study will be dis-
cussed in the section titled Method.
Scope
The model in Figure I below shows the general relationship between the
focus of this study and others. The focus here is on outputs - the opera-
tional aspects of combat rescue operations - as opposed to other foci such
as the decision making process or the international diplomatic and
political inputs. The model is a simplification of the flow of events
from the initiation of the situation until the completion of the effort.
When the decision making authority (the President) is confronted with a
potential rescue situation he can simultaneously pursue a variety of
"tracks" from the diplomatic to the military. When and if the military
track is considered, a list of military options are available which reflect
a broad range of capabilities from threats to major interventions, If the
combat rescue is chosen as an option, it triggers a unique set of planning,
training, and deployment activities. The final decision to "go" launches
the operation. The period between the "go" and the "end" is the primary
focus of this study. But, the link between the preparatory activities and
the performance is also important and is part of this focus, The distinc-
tion to be made here is that the concern is not so much with the process
per se, but rather the extent to which it impacts on performance and the
outcome, Assessment, for example, is hypothesized to be very important to
the outcomes of these operations, and the organization of the assessment
effort is part of the overall assessment process, How the organization
of the assessment effort impacted upon the final operation is part of' the
analysis, But the entire assessment process - organization, routines,
agencies, communications flow, etc, - will not be examined.
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The "real world" flow of events is much more sophisticated and inter-
active than the model suggests, Its purpose is simply to delineate the
scope and focus of this study, It is hoped that a study of the key vari-
ables will result in an identification of the underlying causes Qf success
and failure. Knowledge of why these operations "work" or "don't work"
would be valuable to decision makers and planners. It would aid in the
organization of the bureaucracy and organizational routines, as well as
the design of training and deployment plans,
Why Study These Cases?
These issues do not appear very important'relative to the deterrence
of strategic nuclear war, or planning for world-wide limited war contin-
gencies, But there are at least four reasons why the circumstances
.associated with combat rescue operations make them important,
First, hostage-type situations directly challenge the fundamental
nature of law and order. With few exceptions, nations outlaw and decry
the practice within their borders. Historically, bowing to potential or
explicit ransom demands has invited repetition of the tactic. Once the
· · __ __··
-blackmail cycle begins, it is difficult to halt. On an international
scale it is even more difficult. The national morale can become involved
in the incident and the ability of the government to successfully rescue
the prisoners (through peaceful or forceful means) can become a major issue
of credibility for the political leadership.4 It has become clear that the
Iran hostage crisis had a major impact on the 1980 elections and the di-
rection of U.S. policy;5
Second, calculations of force and military power in the modern world
have become increasingly less relevant in these types of situations,6 With
a military capability literally dozens of times greater than the Iranian
capability, the power ratio aided very little in the resolution of the
situation, Small, specially trained forces were assembled in order to
attempt a precision rescue operation. The idea of a "surgical" response
is not new to U.S. crisis managers, and will likely remain an important
option.
Third, these situations are potentially escalatory and pose grave
dangers for world peace and stability, A military response to a Soviet or
Chinese client state hostage seizure would be a very sensitive considera-.
tion for a president to examine. For example, a consideration of a rescue
of men believed to be held as prisoners of war in North Vietnam or Laos in
1981 would imply the risk of escalation,
Fourth, these operations are potentially costly in terms of lives,
equipment, and the diversion of national time, effort and priorities,
Among the three cases, all were costly in one or more of these respects.8
Relative to more conventional conflicts in U.S. history, the measurable
costs are small. But there appears to be a significant impact upon the
"unmeasurables" such as: national prestige; national orientations; the
potential for escalation; military capabilities; and the political and
diplomatic costs associated with failure. These unmeasurable costs can be
disproportionate to the costs more easily measured in terms of losses of
lives and equipment.
Criticisms
Two major criticisms were encountered in researching and examining
the cases in a comparative fashion. The first is reflected in the follow-
ing statement: "There are no similarities whatsoever between Iran and
Entebbe, or between any of these combat rescue operations if you really
look closely .,. It is like comparing horses and cows or apples and
IT9oranges they are not comparable." At first.glance, the conclusion
appears to be true, But, if the question is profitability, the comparison
of horses and cows becomes an economic choice constrained by measurable
criteria. If the question is nutritional value as measured by vitamin C
content, the comparison of apples and oranges becomes- a chemical comparison
based on the scientifically measurable comparison of the vitamin content of
the two fruits. In both of these analagies, the questions one asks seems
to dictate whether or not the cases can be compared.
The second criticism is that extracting lessons from dissimilar cases
is highly subjective and of little empirical value, However, if it can be
demonstrated through empirical analysis that there are common causal
variables which operate across a wide range of cases, then lessons extracted
from those variables would at least be empirically based.
An awareness of these criticisms contributed to the logic of this
analysis. In this study a sequence of questions will be asked and their
answers examined as an organizing tool to cut through and across the
unique and divergent characteristics of the cases. The questions are
aimed at discovering the important causal variables which contribute to
the outcomes of these operations, The major questions (and where they are
most thoroughly examined) are as follows:
SHow are the cases comparable? (below)
-How do you measure success and failure? (Chapter 4)
Can you identify the important variables which contribute most
directly to the outcome of the operation? (Method, "hypothesis
generation", below)
Can you discover the relationships and weights among the variables?
(Chapter 3)
- Can you develop a model which would be useful? (Chapter 4)
These questions provide a framework within which. superficial differ-
ences can be discounted and substantive conclusions about common phenomena
can be hypothesized and tested. The above criticisms are important but
avoidable for the most part.
As a point of clarification and illustration, the first question
above is addressed here, "How are the cases comparable?" This author
would suggest that there are several interesting comparisons and contrasts
across the three cases even on the superficial level - a direct challenge
to the first criticism. These comparisons and contrasts also raise
questions early on about the cases which should make the case scripts in
Chapter 2 more interesting and illuminating.
Seven comparisons and contrasts illustrate similarities on a super-
ficial level.10 (1) Son Tay and Iran were sophisticated and detailed
operations with very closely calculated risks and estimated (by the plan-
ners) high probabilities of success, Mayaguez was more conventional and
straightforward, with little time available for detailed planning. It
was also lacking in any detailed estimate of success other than a sure
knowledge that the U.S, had superior forces and the determination to
secure the release of the crew and ship, At best, the Koh Tang Island
11
assault contributed in a very indirect way to the release of the crew.
(2) Son Tay and Iran posed similar difficulties for the penetration of
unfriendly airspace over long distances, Mayaguez presented the problem
of assembling and moving forces from widely separated locations on short
notice. (3) All three operations involved the use of helocopters (of the
53 series:) to insert the rescue force, and the use of supporting aircraft
such as the C-130 Hercules transport or navigational models, and various
tactical supporting aircraft. (4) All three operations were planned and
directed at the highest levels of the U,S. government. Son Tay and Iran
were planned and launched within six months, M!yaguez was the culmination
of barely sixty hours of preparations, (5) Son Tay was planned and
executed in the context of the Viet Nam war; whereas the other cases were
in periods of relative peace. (16) The American's held at Son Tay were
prisoners of-war, but they were also pawns in the Paris peace negotiations
- and in effect, hostages. The crew of the Mayaguez was in an unknown
status, The President assumed that the Cambodian intentions were hostile
and suspected eventual ransom or propaganda demands. The U.S. personnel
in the Tehran embassy were clearly hostages held for ransom, (7) The Son
Tay mission was generated by an intelligence discovery by a low level unit,
rather than in the context of a public crisis - this fact greatly eased
the problem of maintaining secrecy. Mayaguez and Iran on the other hand
were generated within the contexts of public awareness and the secrecy
problem was therefore more difficult.1 2
The similarities on this level allow the operations to be grouped as
a class. Beyond these considerations there are underlying and more funda-
mental similarities as well, What role does secrecy play? How important
is the achievement of surprise? How these and other more fundamental
variables will be examined is discussed in the following section.
METHOD
The methodology employed in this analysis is organized around the
answers to two central questions: (1) What hypotheses can be generated
for success and failure?; (2) How can these hypotheses be tested within the
format of a structured comparative analysis? The answers are discussed in
the following two subsections on hypotheses generation and hypotheses test-
ing.
Hypotheses Generation
Ten important variables were identified as important to the outcomes-.
of rescue operations: assessment; speed; surprise; security; command; con-
trol; communications; transportation; force selection; and, force training.
(The definitions and implications of each will be discussed in detail in
Chapter 3). These variables were derived from the study and analysis of
several foreign experiences, most notably the Israeli rescue at Entebbe
and the German rescue at Mogadishu.,13 Additionally, U.S, service manuals
and military doctrinal publications provided the theoretical framework for
the identification of the variables.14 A detailed analysis of how these
were developed is beyond the scope of the current study. However, the
variables were developed independently of the three cases to be examined
here.
These ten variables appear to have a great impact on the outcomes of
these operations. The causal link to ultimate favorable results and the
interrelationships among the variables are not known. But in the Entebbe
and Mogadishu cases the highly favorable outcomes were critically dependent
upon the variables listed above. To approach.the problem of applying the
variables to three U.S. cases, the first step was to group similar and
apparently related variables into a.single hypothesis with multiple parts.
For example, it is simpler to discuss command, control and communications
within the context of a three part hypothesis; but the artificial grouping
does not degrade the independence of the variables.
The ten variables were then grouped into five hypotheses, For example,
in the command, control and communications hypothesis, it is stated that
if the operations were successful, then their success was critically
dependent upon effective command, control and communications. (The defini-
tions are contained within the hypothesis statement.) In Chapter 3, each-
hypothesis is followed by a brief discussion of the concept and meaning of
the variable(s) as they apply to the combat rescue operations in general.
A sixth hypothesis was generated but not listed. It was based on an
eleventh variable - planning. A corollary to "planning" was "contingency
planning", or the detailed preparation for uncertainties and unforeseeable
circumstances. However, these two variables and the sixth hypothesis
were not presented separately. Instead, the element of planning (and
particularly contingency planning) is inherent and implied within each of
the other five hypotheses. For example, consider communications. Planning
the communications for a complex operation is essential and is part of the
function of communications in the operation. It is very difficult to
evaluate the role of communications in a combat rescue operation without a
basic knowledge of the requirements as they were reflected in the plan.
In short, the five hypotheses state that success and failure can be
accounted for by the level of performance of the key functional variables.
The next step is to develop a method for testing the hypothesea.
Hypotheses Testing
The concept of hypotheses testing employed here followR three distinct
steps. The first step is to construct a model in tabular form through. an
analysis of the appropriateness and performance of each of the hypothesis
to each of the three cases, considered in chronological order. The format
is reflected in the chart in Figure II below. The distinguishable aspects
of each hypothesis will be assigned a rating based on an analysis of its
application and function in each of the three cases and will be "high",
"medium", or "low". The perspective in time for rating the performance is
after the fact - hindsight with the benefit of detailed knowledge. A high
rating reflects the conclusion that the variable was operative and func-
tioned in a highly favorable and beneficial manner to the performance of
the operation. A medium rating reflects a performance in a less beneficial
manner. A low rating reflects a rating which is based on the conclusion
that the variable(s) was operative but the performance was poor,15 (These
ratings could be viewed probabilistically. A high rating might correspond
to a .98 chance of success; a medium to a .80 chance; and a low to a
16
.65.) This is accomplished in Chapter 3.
The second step is to develop a definition of success and failure,
independent of the hypotheses and variables above, and according to which
the three cases can be rank-ordered into relative positions of the most
successful to the least successful. This is accomplished in the first
part of Chapter 4.
The third step will then be to rearrange and rank. order the cases
vertically and horizontally and to rearrange the ratings from high to low
in an array which is basically a rearrangement of the model in Figure II.
The model can then be examined for any evidence of Guttman-type scalingl7
and relevant conclusions can be derived, if any, The combination of test-
ing, ranking and rearranging should provide some interesting results which
are presented in the third part of Chapter 4,
HYP I HYP TI HYP III HYP IV HYP V
CASE ONE
CASE TWO
CASE THREE
FIGURE II
Other Considerations
There are several complications associated with a study of this
nature, and an awareness of them should minimize distortions in the
analysis. First, these operations are inherently complex. There are
numerous processes underway simultaneously during the crisis - assessment,
planning, evaluation and training, decision-making, execution, etc. They
are overlapping, interrelated, and often constrained by time and resources.
They are shaped and influenced by a multitude of factors such as personnel,
experience, available equipment and technology, and perceptions. The
extraction of variables is a simplification of this complex and uncertain
unfolding of events. But, the reduction of the performance of the oper-
ation to the proposed model is accomplished with a sensitivity to the
difficulty of making clear judgments, It is for this reason that relative
ratings and rankings with supportive analysis and evidence, rather than
precise value allocations, are proposed and utilized,
The second consideration is that there are several imponderables which
enter into this kind of study. How important is luck? Does "Murphy's
Law" really operate? Luck appears to be, and with substantial mathe-
matical justification influenced positively by maximizing the probabilities
of factors which induce success, and minimizing the opposite. Several
questions which will be raised in Chapter Two and addressed in Chapter
Three.relate to these imponderables. Was it bad luck that the prisoners
were moved out of Son Tay? Or, was it due to a security leak, the failure
of intelligence to detect it, or a failure in the evaluation of the
intelligence which suggested it? Was it bad luck that the Mayaguez rescue
force assaulted the wrong island with the wrong tactics at the wrong time?
Or was this case another intelligence or judgment failure? Was it bad
luck in Iran that an excessive number of helicopters failed, dust storms
were encountered and a pilot flew into another aircraft? Or, was it due
to poor planning and training? "I don't believe in luck" is one of
Gregory Peck's most famous lines from a World War II movie, Twelve O'Clock
High. That line summed up his belief that discipline, training, planning
and other important factors under man's control determined the outcome,
and not some blind act of nature for which you cannot prepare. There are
indeed acts of God and major unforeseeable random events for which no
amount of preparation can dictate success or preclude failure, But in the
three cases examined here, such catastrophic and uncontrollable factors
apparently were not the critical determinants,18
Murphy's Law is a close relative of luck, It states in effect that
if something can go wrong, it will go wrong. Every military planner has
heard of this law. If you do not plan for contingencies they will occur,
The law is of course unscientific and somewhat superstitious, but ~t is
reinforced by a wealth of experience. Planning for contingencies, especi-
ally equipment failures, seems to frustrate the impact of this "law~'. In
the three cases here, the law seemed to operate. But, the impact of the
unforeseen contingency in each case was mostly a reflection of the plan-
ning and preparation for the range of things that could go wrong,19
Finally, hindsight often prejudices analysis by injecting facts and
conditions that were unknown at the time, Escaping from the circumstances
and looking back from an omnipresent eye is often unfair as a basis for
criticism, But the purpose is not to criticize, Rather, it is to analyze
the case of recent U.S. experience with the intention of deriving conclu-
sions that will be benefit in future similar operations. The men and
women associated with these operations were, and are, dedicated,
20
courageous and self-sacrificing. Any criticisms of these operations are
not directed at them, nor in any way intended to detract from their
heroic'efforts. This study is undertaken with the spirit of learning
from past mistakes in order to prevent their recurrence in the future.
Avoidable errors cost lives and resources unnecessarily.
FOOTNOTES
1. Benjamin F. Schemmer, The Raid. Harper and Row, New York, 1976,
page 59.
2. This typology is my own based on my analysis of the key distinguish-
ing characteristics of this type of operation. The typology deliber-
ately allows for the inclusion of a wide range of military-type res-
cues; from commando raids to larger conventional operations.
3. Alexander George, "Case Studies and Theory Development.,,.", in
Diplomacy, edited by Paul G. Lauren, 1979.
4. Time, February 2, 1981, pages 53-54.
5. See Time, N.Y. Times, and U.S. News, November 1980.
6. Alternative 1975-85 Political and Strategic Environments for Military
Planners, Volume 1, Hudson Institute, Croton on Hudson, New York,
1971, pages 1-11.
7. Ibid.
8. In terms of lives alone: in Son Tay, two were wounded; in Mayaguez
26 were killed and fifty wounded (not counting fifteen killed in the
deployment phases); in Iran, eight were killed and seven were wounded.
In terms of major items of equipment: in Son Tay one helicopter and
one F-105; in Mayaguez, ten damaged or destroyed helicopters; in
Iran, seven helicopters lost and one C-130 transport destroyed.
9. Interview with anonymous Iran rescue military planner, The senti-
ment reflected in the quotation was encountered frequently in inter-
views and in the literature on comparisons of these operations;
especially a comparison of Iran to Entebbe.
10. A conclusion based upon this authors analysis and evaluation, evid-
ence in the public record, and evidence presented in Chapter Three.
11. This is a controversial point addressed in more detail in Chapter
Four.
12. In the interview with Major General Gray, he felt that the differ-
ence in level of difficulty in maintaining security between Iran and
Son Tay was about ten to one. The degree of difference is debat-
able, but the point is well-taken that the level of difficulty is an
important consideration to keep in mind when evaluating or comparing
these operations.
13. See Bibliography.
14. Ibid.
15. A fourth rating is implied here, and that is, "Not Applicable". If
a variable is inapplicable it will be so identified.
16. A planner might view this rating from the standpoint of calculations
of probabilities of success based on the likelihood of successful
outcomes for particular cases and variables. A high probability of
success variable might serve as a guide for planning or training in
a future operation. More importantly such a probabilistic rating
might be encouraging to planners to hedge strongly against contin-
gencies by building redundant systems and flexibility for contin-
gencies into the operation. If, for example, it could be shown that
a highly reliable means of transportation is essential to success,
then a planner or decision maker would be wise to build safety mar-
gins, in terms of reliability and numbers, into the operation of
sufficient size as to assure the performance of the transportation
function.
17. The method is based upon notes and discussions with Professor Stephen
Meyer, Political Science Department at M.I.T., and is borrowed from
the statistical Guttman procedures. In.this simplified method, the
analysis is nonstatistical. The arrangement of the cases and variebles
on vertical and horizontal axes in the form of a tabular array might
yield meaningful results if patterns exist across the cases, and a
rising curve cuts across the cases identifying the most relevant
variables to success and failure in the cases examined.
18. The conclusion is based upon completed analysis of Chapter Two and
Three.
.19. Ibid.
CHAPTER TWO
CONTEXTS AND OPERATIONS OF THE THREE CASES
CASE ONE -- Son Tay, 19701
Origins of the Crisis
On May 9, 1970, an intelligence analyst with the Air Force 1127 Field
Activities Group, Fort Belvoir, Virginia identified two North Vietnamese
prison camps that appeared to hold American prisoners of war. One of the
camps, Son Tay, was located in a relatively isolated region, 23 miles west
of Hanoi. Reconnaissance photographs, revealed a unique arrangement of
rocks in the vicinity of the prison compound, which were analyzed and
deciphered by the intelligence analyst, His theory was that American POW!s,
probably performing hard labor, had piled the rocks in such a fashion as
to deceive the prison guards, and in a form which sent a message in code.
The. message indicated the presence of American POWls, and requested a rescue.
Information was disseminated from the intelligence community to the Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon and eventually to an
organization called SACSA (Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and
Special Activities), SACSA eventually became the organization which man-
aged the operation for the Chairman of the JCS, By May 23, the Chairman
(General Earl Wheeler) had made the decision to study the feasibility of a
rescue operation, and to organize and proceed with the effort,
International Context
In the international context, the United States was negotiating with
the North Vietnamese at the Paris peace conference, and it had become
clear to the Administration's negotiators that the American POW's were
hostages to be used by the North Vietnamese as a strategic bargaining
chip.2 The talks were stalemated. Despite the termination of bombing of
North Vietnam in 1968, progress towards an agreement had been slow and
painful. The President elected to expand the war overtly into Cambodia on
April 28 with a conventional ground and air operation in an attempt to
eliminate .'NorthVietnamese sanctuaries, and slow the resupply of the Viet
Cong forces in the South. The invasion was very unpopular internationally
and instigated renewed and intensive criticism from allies, as well as
triggering heightened polemics and tensions with adversaries.
Domestic Context
Several events in the spring of 1970 made the domestic context very
difficult for President Nixon. Protests against the war reached a new high
with demonstrations at the White House over the Cambodian invasion and
which caused the Secret Service to surround the White House grounds with
city buses parked end to end. A few days later, the National Guard fired
upon and killed four students in a demonstration at Kent State University.
Additionally, two of Henry Kissinger's assistants resigned over the
Cambodian invasion, and Congress as well as the nation were becoming
increasingly polarized over the lack of progress in the peace process, and
the overt expansion of the war into Cambodia. The POW issue was a very
salient one for the American people, as well as for the Administration's
leaders, Reports of the mistreatment and death of a number of POW!s,
coupled with the general frustration over the stalemated talks and mounting
causalty rates, helped to create a context in which a raid into North Viet-
nam to free American POW's was seen as highly desirable, but politically
risky.
The Operation3
In phase one of the operation, beginning around June 10th, a fifteen
man feasibility study group was authorized by the JCS, The group, under
SACSA control, began serious planning and utilized expanded intelligence
means to prepare the tentative rescue plan, Additionally it was tasked to
select the appropriate leaders, forces, equipment and training sites.
(Tragically, the American POW's were moved out of the Son Tay prison camp
on July 14th. Ironically, this was the day after the ground force command-
er, Colonel Simons, was chosen to lead the rescue mission and months before
the rescue attempt, Unknown at the time, the planning continued,) By
August 28th, the plan had been finalized, subject to improvements and
changes necessitated by revised intelligence estimates.
Phase two began about September 9th, and included the completion of
the selection of the forces, intensive training, preparation of equipment
and briefings, and the comprehensive evaluation of the force's readiness.
By October 10th, the force was ready, The first time frame or "window"
for the launch was October 20-25, primarily determined by anticipated
weather considerations. But this first window was delayed by the Presi-
dent because of a degree of progress at the Paris talks, reservations on
the potential impact of an "invasion" of North Vietnam on the domestic and
international tensions, and poor weather. By early November, and after
the first window passed, it became apparent to the President that the Paris
talks were hopelessly bogged down, the North Vietnamese were violating a
whole series of "understandings" associated with the bombing halt, and
there was more news of American POW mistreatment and death in North Viet-
nam, The combination of perceptions led President Nixon to reconsider the
use of the rescue force. The second launch window selected was November
21-25. The major consideration was that a failure to launch in this peri-
dd:(would probably incur a delay until spring -- after the monsoon rains
and poor weather conditions had subsided. The Secretary of Defense gave
tentative approval to the Chairman for deployment and final preparations.
The force was deployed to Thailand; equipment was readied; and the final
go ahead was received on the 18th of November,
In phase three, the Task Force Commander, Brigadier General Leroy
Manor, awaited the break in the weather considered necessary for the
mission's success. The break came on November 21st, and the force launched
from Thailand, flew over Laos, and on into North Vietnam, The rescue team
assaulted the prison compound at Son Tay accompanied by diversionary mis-
sions of Naval and Air Force aircraft. The compound was indeed occupied
as the reconnaissance photographs had revealed, but there were no American
POW's. The rescue force completed a reorganization and consolidation after
a brief but explosive firefight with local enemy forces, and the U.S. force
departed the area without a single rescued prisoner of war and after
twenty-six minutes on the ground.
The operation was marred by a potentially serious command, control
and communications problem. The failure of the intelligence assessment
regarding the POW's exposed the Administration to the criticisms of having
"invaded" North Vietnam and having failed to verify that there were POW's
at Son Tay,4 There were other failures and problems as well, and these
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three.
CASE TWO -- Mayaguez, 1975
Origins of the Crisis
The S.S. Mayaguez was a thrity-one year old cargo ship, captained by
Charles T. Miller and a crew of thirty-nine men, The ship was under U.S.
registry, was owned by Sea Land Services, Incorporated, and all thirty-
nine members of the crew were U,S. citizens and civilians. The Mayaguez
was sailing enroute from Hong Kong to Sattahip, Tahiland with a contain-
erized cargo of commercial items, The ship carried no weapons, ammunition,
or spy equipment; the cargo consisted essentially of food, clothing,
medical supplies and other commercial products,5 On the morning of May
12, 1975,6 the Mayaguez was fired upon by Cambodian gunboats, boarded,
and seized by Khmer Rouge coastal forces in the vicinity of Poulo Wai
Island about sixty miles west of the Cambodian mainland, and about six
miles south of the island, During the seizure, the Captain sent an S.O.S,
and a report which was received in Jakarta, Indonesia. The notification
of the seizure was passed on to the U.S, embassy in Jakarta and forwarded
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to the White House through embassy channels. The Mayaguez was led to the
island of Poulo Wai where it anchored and spent the night (local time).
The Cambodians attempted to move the ship into the port of Kompong Som,
but Captain Miller's delaying tactics successfully prevented it.
International Context
International tensions were acute at the time of the seizure. Ten-
sions heightened in the world with the fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975,
following the fall of Cambodia thirteen days earlier. The fall of Saigon
marked the termination of the era of U,S. involvement in Southeast Asia in
which massive resources were committed and without apparent success, and
the credibility of U,S. power was seriously weakened by the physical de-
feat of the South Vietnamese on the battlefield,8 Maxwell Taylor conclud-
ed that "One is obliged to assume that an immediate consequence of this
tragedy will be widespread leoss of confidence in our reliability, partic-
ularly among allies nearest the scene. "9 Other events contributed to the-
tension, The first and still recent resignation of a U.S. president under
the criminal implications of "Watergate" raised serious doubts about U.S.
leadership, Secretary of State Kissinger!s efforts to forge a settlement
in the Sinai amid renewed threats of war by President Sadat of Egypt were
rebuffed by Israel, The dispute between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus
threatened NATO's ,southern flank and disturbed the security of the alliance,
The oil price hikes of 1973 and the subsequent shocks to the economies of
western nations pushed many nations, and particularly the U.S. into a
recession. The combination of these events created a crisis of confidence
at home and abroad.11 Many questionned the will of the U.S. to meet its
commitments.
Domestic Context
Domestically, the context was equally difficult. Gerald Ford was a
president without an elected mandate. He has succeeded to the presidency
under the storm clouds of Watergate and the Nixon pardon, and in one of
the most politically disturbing periods of U.S. history. Americans were
frustrated and confused over world events, particularly Southeast Asia,
and about the only consensus was that the decision to escalate the Viet
Nam war in 1965 was probably the most "disastrous American decision of the
century.'12 There was no broad consensus among Americans in general, the
Congress, the Executive, or policy analysts regarding the future leadership
role of the U.S. in world affairs. The seizure of the .Mayaguez shocked the
American public and President Ford perceived it as a test of U.S. will and
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resolve. These domestic factors were interrelated with the international
ones, and they combined to create a situational context in which a strong
and forceful response was perceived by the President as necessary.
The Operationl4
The first phase of the crisis covered essentially the first twenty-
four hours. Notification of the seizure was received at the State Depart-
ment and forwarded to the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon
and to the Situation Room at the White House. The JCS acting Chairman,
General David Jones, ordered reconnaissance efforts to locate the ship and
confirm the report. The President and Secretary of State were notified
of the situation early that morning-May 12, 1975, President Ford met with
the National Security Council at noon to discuss the crisis. A consensus
of opinion was reached at the first meeting. Objective "one" was to re-
cover the ship and crew; and "two" was to do so in such a way as to
demonstrate firmly to the international community that the U.S, could and
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would act with firmness to protect its interests, In addition to
developing objectives, the first NSC meeting initiated the diplomatic. proc-
cess~,movement of military forces to the area, contingency planning, and
informing the public, During the remainder of this phase, the ship was
located by reconnaissance aircraft, and tracked in its move from Poulo
Wai to Koh Tang Island. The machine gun fire from the Cambodian gunboats
directed at U.S, observation planes seemed to signal hostile Cambodian
intentions.
Phase two of the crisis covered the period from early Tuesday morning
to Wednesday afternoon. By early Tuesday morning intelligence reports
confirmed the report that Cambodian gunboats were escorting the ship to
the mainland. As reports flowed in to the White House, the President and
his advisors became concerned with the means to prevent the movement of
the crew and ship to the mainland, Assets were identified, and US. air-.
craft were authorized limited demonstrations of force to fire across the
16bow of the Mayaguez and the gunboats, Eventually, the Cambodian gun.
boats disregarded the warnings and the President authorized the sinking of
any gunboats attempting to sail to the mainland, A fishing boat with
Caucasians aboard was allowed to move into Kompong Som on the mainland
only after warning shots across the bow and "gassing" the boat with riot
agents failed to stop its movement, From this point forward, no U.S.
decision maker knew with great reliability the location of the entire
crew. Later reports revealed that four gunboats had been sunk by this
17time.
The National Security Council met for the second and third times
during this phase. The second meeting was a review of the latest intel-
ligence, refinement of contingency planning and continuation of the
diplomatic effort. The third meeting was held Tuesday night. At the
meeting, a review of the combat action and intelligence reports, coupled
with discouraging and unfruitful diplomatic efforts revealed that the
available options were diminishing. Shortly after the meeting, planning
18guidance was issued for the likely rescue operation. Between the third
meeting that night and the fourth held the next afternoon, the evolution
of events confirmed the need for the rescue in the minds of the President
and his advisors. Diplomatic efforts had failed. Clear warnings followed
by the sinking of gunboats had failed to convince the Cambodian government
to return the ship and crew, Cambodia was perceived as a hostile country,
and the U.S. had no direct way of communicating with the new Khmer govern-
ment.
Phase three began with the fourth NSC meeting and the order to begin
the rescue operation. The plan of operation consisted basically of three
simultaneous actions: first, one element would seize the Mayaguez; second,
aircraft from the Coral Sea would strike the Cambodian mainland and support
the other operations; third, .a Marine battalion would conduct a heloborne
assault on Koh Tang Island in two waves to rescue the crew believed held
there. In the actual operation, the ship was seized without firing a shot
-- it had been abandoned. The strike aircraft bombed the mainland with
little opposition, But the Koh Tang Island assault quickly became a major
problem. The expected resistance was greatly exceeded by actual resistance
by strong defenders on the Island. There were severe command, control and
communications problems. The assault force was quickly separated and
pinned down by effective enemy fire. (The Cambodian officials holding the
crew meanwhile released them in a Thailand fishing boat which was
intercepted and rescued by a U,S. destroyer,) The operation on Koh Tang
became a question of extracting the force with minimum casualties. The
combination of problems on the Koh Tang assault contributed to the deaths
of 26 servicemen (and fifty wounded), and severe damage or destruction to
ten of eleven helicopters. But, the crew and ship were recovered, and the
U.S. had demonstrated its will and resolve. Overall, the operation was
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considered a success by the President, most of the Congress., and the
American public.20 But the rescue operation on Koh Tang Island was clear-
ly not a "good" operation, and merits further study as to "why?",
CASE THREE -- Iran, 198021
Origins of the Crisis
On November 4th, 1979, Iranian student militants stormed the United
States embassy in Tehran, Iran, and seized American embassy personnel,
visitors, and some Iranian workers. Shortly thereafter, a small group of
prisoners was released, but fifty-three Americans remained in captivity
until a negotiated settlement was finally reached and the hostages releas-
ed on January 20th, 1981.
Shortly after the seizure of the embassy, it became apparent that the
students were acting with the blessing of the Ayatollah Khomeni, Iran's
revolutionary religious leader. "Ransom" demands for the release of the
"hostages" were soon articulated by the students and refined by the govern-
ment. The event was received with incredulity around the world. This was
the first time a government in modern history had participated in such a
blatant violation of international law and become a party to what was
formerly considered a terrorist tactic,22 President Carter was notified
of the seizure on the 4th of November, and before the full implications
of the Iranian government's role were known, the U.S. denounced the act
and demanded the return of the embassy and the freedom of the embassy per-
sonnel. In the days that followed, the President utilized the NSC and
later, a modified crisis action group to deal with the situation on a
continuing basis. The President renounced direct military action as a
viable option the day after the embassy was taken. The receipt of a
series of demand through unofficial channels heightened the seriousness of
the situation and the U,S, denounced the seizure as criminal international
blackmail.
International Context
In the international context, the U,S, was at war wtth no country and
suffering no major confrontational crisis except for continuing economic
difficulties and frictions within the membership of the Atlantic Alliance.
The following month, the seizure became immensely complicated by the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and 1980 became a long year filled with
frustration and crises for the U,S, and the world.23 The renunciation of
the use of force and the alternative pursuit of diplomatic and economic
sanctions against Iran was complicated by the balking support of allies and
turmoil within Iran. The sanctions against the Soviet Union over the
Afghanistan issue also contributed to the frictions within the alliance.
The consideration of options was accomplished with these larger issues
in mind. Track "A" -- the political, diplomatic and economic track --
was pursued publicly; while Track B -- the military track -- was pursued
in great secrecy, The military option to rescue the hostages was immensely
complex due to a variety of political, security, geographical, logistical
and particularly complex international considerations,
Domestic Context24
Domestically, the economic situation was a major preoccupation as
inflation and induced recession continued to resist effective management,
The debate over the SALT 1I Treaty was about to begin in Congress and was
of major interest to most Americans, The presidential race was launched
and it promised to be an exciting election year, The seizure of the
American embassy in Iran was a great shock to the nation and nightly
renditions of chanting anti-American crowds in the streets of Tehran had
a galvanizing effect on the public, It seemed incredible that such an
act could be committed and yet the United States seemed unable to do
anything about it, Despite severe pressure to take military action the
President resisted and publicly pursued Track A. While hoping that Track
B would not he needed, the preparations were made. The President deliber-
ately fostered the deception that a military rescue option was not
feasible,25
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The Operation
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In phase one, from the 4th of November to the 29th of March, the JCS
activated an ad hoc organization to plan, organize and train for a rescue
operation in the utmost secrecy, The emphasis on secrecy was predicated
upon the correct perception that any hI'ht of an impending rescue opera-
tion would make a rescue attempt even more difficult. The forces and
equipment were assembled and trained and many serious problems were dis-
covered before Christmas, 1979. During successive fits and starts in
training, planners and leaders of the rescue force became more and more
confident in their capability. By the 29th of March, 1980, the key
decision makers shared that confidence. Concurrently, supporting intel-
ligence activities within Iran (verification of the location of the hos-'.
tages and the security arrangements, infiltration of agents, etc..) were
reaching fruition. The President hesitated to pursue the rescue until it
was clear that the risks were manageable and that political conditions
would permit that course of action, The window for the launch was narrow-
ing as light and weather conditions began to work against the requirements
of the plan - the need for a specified amount of darkness and a range of
air temperatures for heavy lift helicopters,
In phase two, lasting roughly until the 23rd of April, the plan was
finalized and late-developing changes incorporated into the plan, On the
16th of April, the JCS approved the plan and briefed the President who gave
the order to go ahead with a target date of April 24th, The units were
deployed and in position by the 23rd and the final order to "execute" was
given by the President,
The mission began the evening of the 24th (the third phase) with the
launch of helicopters from the U.S, carrier Nimitz, and C-130 aircraft
from Egypt. The two elements were to rendezvous at a refueling site
called "Desert One," Due to an excessive number of helicopter problems
the mission had insufficient numbers with which to continue and the
mission was cancelled. Shortly thereafter, an accident occurred at Desert
One in which two aircraft caught fire, eight servicemen were killed, and
the mission was hopelessly compromised. The decision was made by the
leaders at Desert One to quickly evacuate the area. Had the plan been
executed in full, there were two subsequent phases, From Desert One the
force would move under cover of darkness to a "Mountain Hideout," link up
with agents, infiltrate the following night into Tehran, overcome security
and resistance at the embassy, then call for the helicopters, extract the
force and hostages, and then fly to a second desert site, In the final
phase the entire group would transfer to C-130's and fly out of Iran. The
failure of the mission at Desert One makes a critical analysis of subse-
quent planning somewhat speculative, It is interesting to note however,
that the President and his advisors felt that the plan had a very good
chance of success, and that the operation at Desert One was probably the
most difficult phase of the operation.28
The rescue attempt was a courageous effort, and there were many very
positive aspects to the operation in the areas of assessment, training,
and execution. However, the failure of the operation was a severe
embarrassment to the President and to the military capability of the
United States, The after the fact JCS Special Operations Review Group
Report (hereafter referred to as the Holloway Report) identified twenty-
three issues of significance which were worthy of criticism.
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CHAPTER THREE
HYPOTHESES AND CASES
INTRODUCTION
The five hypotheses to be tested will be presented one at a time.
After the statement and definition of each, a brief discussion will follow.
The discussion will simultaneously serve as an introduction to the ceases
(in terms of the hypothesis) and will relate and explain the relevance of
the hypothesis to combat rescue operations, The hypothbsiq will then be
applied and tested against each case, The conclusions and ratings will be
summarized as the analysis progresses, and the results tabulated in Table
I at the end of the chapter,
HYPOTHESIS I: Success is critically dependent upon ASSESSMENT (the
collection, evaluation and dissemination of informa-
tion) which drives the planning, training and execu-
tion of the operation and which requires:
(a) the continual modification of planning, training
and execution based upon the latest intelligence;
(b) centralized, integrated and coordinated assess-
ment efforts; and,
(c) the maximum use of the widest range of assessment
assets,
There are a variety of sources which describe the means and the
techniques for gathering intelligence, analyzing and evaluating it, and
disseminating it to the key decision makers on a timely basis. In a com-
bat rescue operation, the intelligence community is called upon on a time-
sensitive basis to support the necessary preparations from the first
moment after the mulitary option is considered. It is almost a truism
among military planners that assessment drives most operations from incep-
tion to conclusion, and that perception is particularly relevant to combat
rescue operations. Unlike most conventional operations, the rescue is
generally a "one shot" opportunity in which the role of assessment is
greatly magnified. The key aspects of this hypothesis, as stated above,
are believed to be critically important to the outcome of the operation.
For example, incorrect assessments regarding the location of the
prisoners means the rescue force will arrive at the wrong location, Re-
adjusting and moving the force after it is committed can become extremely
domplex and difficult. The advantages of surprise and security might be
completely lost. A subsequent attempt might become even more complex.
(This hypothetical scenario appears to be more fact than fiction. The role
of assessment in the three cases was extremely important,)
Assessment failures in more conventional operations are not neces-
sarily fatal to the overall effort (like Pearl Harbor,.the German Ardennes
counteroffensive and TET in Viet Nam). The opportunity exists in these
larger contexts for alternate strategies, reinforcement to regain superi-
ority, or a multitude of other options. As stated in "Ia" above, combat
rescue operations do not share that flexibility and the success or failure
of the rescue depends upon the latest intelligence. Assessment dominates
the entire process from planning to execution and necessitates the con-
tinual.modification of the effort based on the latest assessments.
The issue of "organization" (reflected in "Ib" above) is as important
as the accuracy of the intelligence itself. It states that if the infor-
mation is not organized with the necessary centralized, integrated and
coordinated intelligence efforts, the information will be useless for a
successful rescue. An illustration of the importance of the organization
issue was the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. The information regarding
an impending attack was apparently available, but the assessment organiza-
tion was not.
The advances in technology is recent years have greatly contributed to
the ability of experts to assemble the pieces of the intelligence puzzle
which reflect the reality of the situation. The use of these assets in
combat rescue preparations is critical. -In Case One (Son Tay), the entire
range of assets was not utilized. In Case Two (Mayaguez), time constraints
did not permit the use of some assets; although others such as photographic
reconnaissance means were available but not utilized, In Cast Three (Iran),
the technical means employed were extensive. The widest possible use of
assets in "Ic" above reflects the use of nontechnical sources as well.
The importance of human intelligence sources can be extremely important as
will become evident in the discussion of Case One.
In summary, the hypothesis states that success is critically depen-
dent upon assessment and that there are several constituent parts (a-c)
which define its function. Although the focus is upon assessment, it is
not stated that assessment is unrelated to other hypotheses and variables
such as surprise, or control. In fact, evidence of these relationships
will be illustrated throughout the analyses. They hypothesis will now be
applied to each of the three cases. The appropriateness and relevance
will be discussed. A rating will be assigned for the performance of
assessment in each case, and the results tabulated.
I. HYPOTHESIS ONE - CASE ONE2
a. The Role of Assessment
The discovery of American POW's at Son Tay was a dramatic tribute to
American assessment efforts. As the bombing campaign over Laos and North
Vietnam intensified in 1967 and 1968, the number of pilots and crewmen
shot down dramatically increased, The year before, in 1966, the intelli-
gence community began to;organize a systematic effort to exploit every
source of intelligence on the status and location of POW's, and as of the
time of the bombing halt in 1968 very little success had been achieved.
Among the Air Force 1127 Field Activities Group's two dozen or so major
priorities were included assessments of Soviet ICBM sites, location of
ballistic submarines, tank parks in East Germany, and rice caches in
Cambodia. But the Evasion and Escape Branch of the unit found time to
survey sites in North Vietnam for POW camps. The effort was part of the
"Interagency Prisoner of War Intelligence Committee" headed by the Defense
Intelligence Agency. Son Tay had been identified as early as 1968 as a
possible prison compound but no conclusive evidence of its occupation by
Americans had been discovered. Reconnaissance photos were the primary
means of intelligence for the initial discovery of the American presence
at Son Tay, and an analyst detected a code in the rock piles shown in the
photograph. Indeed, throughout the entire operation, the team involved
with the rescue relied heavily on reconnaissance from drones and aircraft.
Alternate sources were also used to a lesser extent, but some existing and
available means such as remote sensors and infilteated agents were not
used.
It was discovered on May 9, 1970 that there were two POW camps west
of Hanoi at Ap Lo and Son Tay; and at the latter location there seemed to
be a message which said there were 55 POW's there,and a rescue was pos-
sible.. By May 25th, the information had been passed through a series of
official and unofficial channels and was briefed to the JCS. Given the
location of the compound in a fairly remote location, and the strength of
corroborating photographic evidence, the military option for a rescue be-
came a viable consideration and the order was given to proceed with more
detailed planning, to organize supporting intelligence, and to establish
a core of personnel with supporting communications. Brigadier General
Blackburn at SACSA became the leader of the organizing effort in the first
phase until a Joint Task Force Commander was appointed.
The information about Son Tay was collected, evaluated and dissemi-
1nated to the highest authorities in the Pentagon in a relatively short
time. The plan was conceived from this initial assessment process and
involved further evaluations by other experts and military leaders. .
JCS Chief Wheeler ordered the dedication of priority intelligence
gathering assets for the planners of the mission that included the priority
-to tap the best people in the CIA and DIA, and the use of sophisticated
equipment and techniques including: SR 71 "big bird"; "Buffalo Hunter"
drones; RF4 reconnaissance jets; weather and special intelligence experts;
and experts that knew how to "thread the needle" and penetrate North
Vietnamese air defenses. By July 10th, the community effort had determined
that Ap Lo was empty and that there were approximately 61 POW's still at
Son Tay. The feasibility study group then focused their efforts on Son
Tay, which illustrated the direct manner in which the assessment effort
drove the planning. The problem became how to get to and from the com-
pound, achieve surprise, rescue the POW's before they could be killed (and
avoid causalties in the initial assault), and then extract the force
all with a high confidence of success, Nearly every detail of the plan-
ning depended directly on the assessments of weather, North Vietnamese
defenses, the situation at the camp and general vicinity, and so forth.
The role of assessment was paramount,
In the second phase of the operation (training of the Task Force) the
planning and training were continually modified by the latest changes and
updates in assessment, By this time the coordination among the various
intelligence agencies had been effected and included priority use and
assets from the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance
Office, Preparations and changes in training proceeded up to the last
minute and were dictated by such factors as the forces they expected to
encounter at the prison compound and in the local area. Several examples
illustrate the process. The plan was changed after a rehearsal and the
latest assessments on the expected threa*. from the guard towers were
received. The planners concluded that they did not have sufficient fire-
power to deal with the threat and added a helicopter gunship to the mission
which would make a pass just before the assault and eliminate the towers,
In another example, the assessments on the expected medical conditions of
the POW's generated a whole series of special medical preparations. In
a third example, last minute intelligence regarding changes in the North
Vietnamese air defense posture caused the TF Commander to add a diver-
sionary flight of F-105's to the mission at the last minute. The opera-
tion is replete with evidence that the assessment drives the planning,
training and execution, and that continual reevaluation greatly improved
the performance of the force in the actual attempt.
b. Issues3
Although the assessment functioned generally well throughout the Son
Tay operation, there were faults in the system and (some) procedures -
especially, but not exclusively, the failure to confirm the presence of
the POW's.
First, there was not complete coordination of the operation at the
highest levels of the government. There were several operations of a
potentially conflicting nature that were evolving concurrently with one
another, and which were not coordinated-primarily due to security consid-
erations, Operation "Popeye", or the weather-altering missions over Laos,
affected weather throughout the region, particularly by causing increased
rainfall. The potential implications of the operation, were not shared
with the Son Tay planners. Knowledge of the weather operation might have
induced the planners to request a temporary suspension of rainmaking,
expecially since weather was so important to the Son Tay raid. Or, more
importantly, it might have provided an explanation for the high water
levels near Son Tay which reconnaissance photographs showed to be near-
flooding. The coordination of "Popeye" with the raid might have at least
given the planners a reason to suspect that the prisoners had been moved
when the intelligence revealed that possibility at the last minute.
These "might's" are rhetorical, but the hypothesis states that fuller
coordination increases the chances of success by at least providing.the
opportunity to discover problems of an actual and potential nature.
The second and most serious problem in coordination resulted from
the assessment that the prisoners were perhaps no longer at Son Tay prison.
Photographs confirmed that the prisoners were there until around mid-July
when the compound appeared abandoned. Around October, the compound was
reoccupied, but every effort to determine "by whom" was frustrated by
some other problem. A special drone photo mission was flown over the com-
pound but it maneuvered a moment too soom and the photograph showed the
clouds above the compound. Because the drones were low flying and
relatively easy to observe, a conscious decision was made not to send
another one and risk alerting the guards at Son Tay. Additionally, an
unverified, but high-ranking source in North Vietnam flatly stated that
the prisoners had been moved. Time was running out for a decision, and
the leaders at SACSA were split. The Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird,
recommended a "go" despite the doubts. Apparently, others were not
advised of the problem. Henry Kissinger later stated that he had never
been informed that there was a question of POW's being there or not.4  The
TF CO and his air and ground leaders were likewise not involved in the
decision. Afterwards, they seemed to feel that the mission should have
been postponed until more evidence was available. The failure to coordi-
nate the issue meant, in effect, the operation was launched with a
significant portion of the success "riding" on hope. Had the operation
been delayed, the raid might have been launched at Camp Faith, about eight
miles to the east; which was occupied. In the face of uncertainty, a
more coordinated and intense intelligence collection and evaluation
effort would have revealed the true situation at Son Tay.
At third example of the coordination problem was the effort to
coordinate intelligence assets with the Strategic Air Command, which had
responsibility and control over the SR 71 reconnaissance aircraft. The
delays and confusion associated with this problem were caused by the
requirement for the TF leaders to work directly with the Reconnaissance
Center at Offut AFB, but without any of the SAC personnel possessing
clearances for the operation. Similar delays were encountered in coordi-
nating drone flights with the 7th Air Force in Saigon for the same reason.
In the latter case with the coordination-problem resulted in delays in
the development and transport of key photos to Washington for evaluation.
The clarity of hindsight was not lost on the Son Tay participants
who recognized the intelligence failure for what it was - a failure to use
the necessary means, procedures and organizations, in a centralized,
organized and coordinated fashion, to assure that the mosaic (at Son Tay)
painted in the assessment process was a picture of reality.
There were other assessment failures, notably related to "Ia" above,
which could have caused a disaster in the execution phase. The H-3 heli-
copter, which deliberately crash-landed in the interior of the prison com-
pound almost truly crashed. The intelligence assessments failed to
account for the growth of the trees over time, which in that climate was
substantial. The analysts further failed to identify a compound nearby
which was heavily armed and well-defined - it was misidentified as a
"secondary school". Only the accidental, but fortuitous landing of the
ground force commander and the assault force next to the "school" pre-
vented that intelligence error from becoming a disaster. Only four
hundred yards away, the compound's machine guns would have been able to
place effective fire on the helicopters and the rescue force.
A final point in the assessment considerations of Son Tay is the
question of means. At no time was a reliable human source tapped for
direct intelligence on Son Tay. The information received from the North
Vietnamese official regarding the move of the POW's was a remarkable piece
of intelligence, but it was not completely reliable. Nor were a variety
of other means utilized. Ground sensors that look like rocks or bushes
could have been dropped into the area and the information relayed to a
collector. A CAS5 could have been inserted with enough priority and
support to assure a reasonable amount of success; or failing in the veri-
fication of conditions at Son Tay, at least not to compromise the opera-
tion. The tendency to rely on photographs created the conditions for
ultimate failure, and could have meant a debacle for the team at Son Tay
that night in North Vietnam.6
Does the hypothesis fit? In summary, there were major problems with
the accuracy and completeness of the intelligence, with the organization
of the assessment effort and with the use of the widest range of assets.
All three contributed in various ways to the ultimate failure of the
assessment - no POW's. But surveyed from a broader perspective there
were major successes as well - the discovery of POW's in the
first place; the assessment of enemy capabilities; and a correct assess-
ment of the necessary forces, equipment and plans to overcome them. I
would argue, considered in total and with the benefit of hindsight, that
the outcome of the Son Tay raid was greatly effected by the assessment
variable. Assigned a "rating", as discussed in methodology, the Son Tay
assessment operation would receive a "low" to "medium" rating in light of
the overriding problems identified above.
II, HYPOTHESIS ONE - CASE TWO - ROLES AND ISSUES
Assessment was the driving force in the reaction to the Cambodian
seizure of the Mayaguez. General Jones' first order as acting Chairman of
the JCS was to dispatch a P-3 reconnaissance aircraft from Thailand, and
later the Philippines, to gather information on the location of the ship
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and confirm its seizure. Subsequent flights and intelligence gathering
efforts were somewhat limited by time constraints imposed by the decisions
of the President. President Ford and the National Security Council assumed
control of the U.S. response early in the crisis and determined that every
effort was:to be made to prevent the transfer of the crew and the ship to
the mainland. The photographs taken by the reconnaissance aircraft were
slow in getting to Washington, and photograph analysts and interpretors
were not immediately available to assure the timely evaluation, and more
important, dissemination of the intelligence on the crew's location.8 The
sighting of Caucasian faces on the Thai fishing boat, and the attack upon
it with non-lethal riot agents (tear gas) to turn it around were unsuc-
cessful. The meaning of the report of Caucasian faces on a boat that
reached the mainland was apparently discounted by the members of the NSC.
The confusion caused by a number of simultaneously received reports from
the various aircraft involved, contributed to the misperception that at
least the "bulk" of the crew was on Koh Tang Island, The available assets
were not directed to verify or confirm the crew's location. Assessments
concentrated on photographic reconnaissance of potential targets on the
mainland, the ship, and Koh Tang Island, from heights of 6,000 feet and
above - out of range of Cambodian machine guns.
The in-theatre intelligence assets of PACOM provided the intial
analyses and interpretation of the photographs and observations of fire
from the island. The assessment provided to the designated on-scene
commander and his planners indicated that Koh Tang was lightly defended.
The Defense Intelligence Analysts in the area and in Washington concluded
that there were 150-200 well-equipped soldiers on the island. But, they
were operating in a different assessment chain of communications, The
DIA assessment was made available to the Joint Task Force Intelligence
Staff, but it was not integrated with the "lightly defended" assessment
and was therefore not made known in time to the key planners and to the
TF Commander. There is no doubt that the ground commander would have
demanded a change in the plan had he know of the DIA assessment. The lack
of any preparatory fires, coupled with a nontactical assault, were viola-
tions of normal assault doctrine. However, the choice of plans was
dictated by considerations of the safety of the crew (believed to be on
the Island) and the limited resistance expected to be encountered. The
impact of the assessment error soon became clear.
The assessment effort was not centralized in Washington, nor in the
local area of the Gulf of Thailand. The information available to the NSC
and the local decision makers was not fully coordinated, including the
best use of assets for confirming the location of the crew. The uninte-
grated assessment effort locally, contributed to the discounting of the
DIA report. A fully integrated effort, coordinated at the highest level,
and centralized at the NSC and/or the TF Headquarters would have very
likely precluded the problem of assessing the "threat" on Koh Tang Island,
Or, speaking probabilistically, it almost certainly would have reduced
the chances of flying into a trap due to a gross assessment failure.
The evidence of a strong force on the Island would have at least gener-
ated contingency planning that would have made close air support avail-
able, and standing by to help.
A P-3 sighted the crew on a fishing boat waving white flags a few
hours after the assault began. By ten o'clock on May 14th, both the
crew and ship had been recovered (the ship at 8:22 a.m. Eastern Time).
The information was relayed to Washington, but the central coordinating
authority for the overall operation, the NSC, did not terminate the main-
land bombing until 11 a.m., or almost an hour after the crew and ship
were recovered. This was primarily a "C3" problem Cdiscussed in hypo-
thesis 2), but it illustrates the impact that timely assessment can have
on these types of operations. This delay led to accusations and criti-
cism that the mainland attacks were punitive and unnecessary. The fact
that a 15,000 pound bomb (BLU-82) was dropped on Koh Tang, after the last
Marines were extracted, reinforced the perception. But it appears that,
aside from the BLU-82, the delay was real, and the mainland attacks were
supportive-not punitive; and that assessment was critical to the termina-
tion of the operation, as well as its initiation.
In a very short period, a complex and detailed operation was pre-
pared, planned and executed. The crew and ship were recovered. But,
assessment problems and failures contributed to the rescue operation's
failure in a very significant, and seemingly avoidable fashion. Given
the "brute force" nature of the assault on Koh Tang, it is difficult to
imagine the rescue of the crew without severe casualties among them -
unless their captors chose to cooperate. The crew's release was appar-
ently a result of the air strikes and had little do do with the rescue
attempt.10
In summary, the hypothesis is relevant to the performance of the
Mayaguez assessment operation, Recognizing the severe constraints
imposed by time and distance, there were avoidable problems. The two
most important assessment failures were the estimation of the forces on
Koh Tang, and the location of the crew. These problems combined to
make the assault precarious and unfruitful. For these reasons the
assessment rates a "low".
III. HYPOTHESIS ONE- CASE THREE - ROLES AND ISSUES
The President and his assistants recognized from the start that any
rescue operation into Iran would be very complex, and that a maximum
assessment effort would have to be made. Not only was the distance an
overriding problem, but there was a complicated refueling problem, an air
space penetration problem, and a host of others - all of which depended
on the best possible intelligence. Evidence of this recognition can be
found in the variety and intensity of assessment efforts, in addition to
the reports and statements of the participants themselves. Agents were
infiltrated into .Iran. Contact was established with agents already in
country. Cooperation was obtained from other national intelligence
ageneies, such as the Canadians, who continued to operate after November
4th in Tehran. Assistance was obtained from several international anti-
terrorist organizations, and experts from other countries assisted in
the training of the rescue force. Even some neutral international organ-
izations and personalities such as the International Red Cross (however
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unwittingly) contributed to the assessment effort. In November, two
military satellites were launched, which gave the JCS access to a total
of six satellites, including one positioned over the Indian Ocean.12
The sources, means, and assets dedicated to the effort were impressive
and emphasized the recognition of the fact that assessment would drive
the complex Iranian rescue operation.13
President Carter felt that the operation in its final form was
based on the best possible information,.was well-conceived and had an
excellent chance of success. Given that the operation was aborted at
Desert One, the analysis of the assessment beyond that phase would be
speculative. This section will focus on the assessment effort in general,
and its role in the operation as it was conducted.
The importance of assessment and the need for the continual revision
and modification of plans and training was recognized, and is reflected
in the numerous evolutionary changes. In December of 1979, a study of
the air defense system, which the force would have to penetrate, led to a
reevaluation of the flight profiles required for the mission (speed,
altitude, time, pattern, navigation, etc.); and the decision to replace
nine pilots with more appropriately experienced pilots. The change cost
the team valuable time. It was also an example of relearning a valuable
lession derived from Project Jungle Jim in 1961, i.e., that it is easier
to train pilots familiar with a type of mission on a new helicopter, as
opposed the reverse.14 This was a failure to another sort - training.
But it is particularly illuminating in that it suggests that assessment
interfaces and intertwines with other variables in these operations.
The detailed planning for the assault on the embassy was continually
revised, especially regarding the choice of weapons and equipment, as
the picture of the situation at the embassy became more clear. Contin-
gency plans were developed to deal with the tricky problem of extracting
the rescue force, should the attempt sputter. The plan was continually
modified to reflect the latest assessments of the Iranian air and ground
forces, and any potential outside interference. The assessment was very
detailed and accurate and U.S. forces were selected to match the per-
ceived threat. U.S. planners apparently knew the location, capability,
condition, and readiness of the entire Iranian Air Force. The lack of.
a night fighting capability, for example,.was a small but critical piece
of information, in evaluating the Iranian air threat and preparing con-
tingencies. (The arrest of a high ranking Iranian Air Force official in
early 1981, under charges of complicity in the U.S. rescue attempt,
suggests that there were perhaps inside sources that contributed to the
intelligence picture.)15
But despite the recognition of the importance of assessment, and the
extent of-the effort, there were many problems and some obvious failures,
The dust storm phenomenon was known to occur but was not predicted by the
intelligence weather experts. It's importance was discounted twice.
First, a decision was made not to fly the route with a weather evaluating
aircraft prior to actual launch, due to security considerations, Second,
the pilots were not briefed on the possibility of encountering dust
clouds or storms, nor were any contingency plans developed to cope with the
problem should it occur. Further, the compartmentalized training concept
did not permit a face to face briefing between pilots and weathermen,
(the normal operating procedure), and therefore there was no opportunity
for the problem to surface. Professional pilots are very sensitive to
weather conditions and there was a good chance that the issue would have
been raised. The weather problem had a tremendous impact on the mission
and contributed directly to its failure.16
A second major problem was the choice of location for Desert One.
Because it was an unimproved airfield built by the CIA during the Shah's
reign, the U.S. planners knew of its existence and location, and more
important, its suitability. The only problem was secrecy. A desert road
ran nearby. Other sites were considered, but ruled out. The threat to
security posed by the road was addressed by adding a special security
team to the rescue force. In the actual operation three Iranian vehicles
passed on the road nearby - a bus full of passengers, a pickup truck and
a fuel truck; almost simultaneously with the arrival of the force at
Desert One. The security element rounded up the Iranian .detainees, except
for one man, who escaped. His importance was discounted by some planners
and decision-makers but it was felt to be a potential compromise by others.
Since the actual rescue would not take place until the following night,
the escapee had twenty-four hours to pass on his experience to Iranian
authorities, who would have had time to investigate the report. Perhaps.
he was a bandit, or was engaged in some illegal activity in the middle of
the desert in the middle of the night; but perhaps not, Would he have
notified anyone, and would it have made any difference? The answer is
debatable and speculative. But it is clear that the traffic was not
expected, nor the security element capable of assuring that any traffic
in the area could be controlled.
The third major problem was the assessment of security requirements
for the penetration to Desert One. Difficult choices were faced, for
example, in the trade-off between total security en route, and the need
to communicate in case of unforeseen problems. The choice for no radio
communication was influenced by the assessments of the Iranian air defense
system, and also the assessment of the Soviet capability to detect the
flight and react.17 These assessments were apparently very serious, and
led to a choice for more security at the expense of radio-use flexibility.
The serious control problem that was encountered during the flight was
caused in part by the prohibition against radio communications. The
judgments involving trade-offs between security, control, communications
and the Iranian (and Soviet) electronic and visual air defense capabili-
ties are much clearer in hindsight. But it illustrates the importance of
balance in the assessment process. Buying security at the expense of
flexibility (and based on assessments of the adversary and possible con-
tingencies) is another illustration of the apparent existence of dilemmas
and trade-offs among some of the variables.
The incelligence capability for the Loint Task Force was slow in
developing, and .neither well-organized nor integrated with the other intel-
18ligence agencies. Unlike an operation in which one of the intelligence
agencies becomes the focal point for the management of the assessment
effort (like the DIA) in direct support of the JTF; in this operation the
JTF intelligence staff attempted to manage the effort internally. This
caused a wide range of severe problems including: a number of delays;
cases of raw data flowing directly to the planners; and the failure to
capitalize on a wider range of exterior agency personnel and equipment
assets. By the end of the planning period however, most of the problems
encountered earlier had been solved, and the necessary personnel and
communications augmentations had been completed.
The inherent problem in this approach was the time element. In a
time sensitive crisis in which only a few days or weeks are available,
this approach would be questionable. In this case, the first real mili-
tary capability to respond was developed around the 29th of November.1 9
The first capability to launch a precision operation with a good chance
of success came around March of 1980.20  The uncoordinated and uninte-
grated nature of the assessment effort delayed the preparations. The
effort was centralized however, in the J-2 of the JTF. It was criticized
for being centralized in the wrong place.
In summary, assessment played an important role in the events leading
to the cancellation of the rescue attempt at Desert One. The emphasis on
intelligence, organization and utilization of assets was clearly operative
and influential on the outcome. In retrospect, despitle many pluses (most
of which are relevant to planned operations beyond Desert One), the three
most serious problems were: the choice of the rendezvous site; discount
of the dust problem ; and the overemphasis on security en route. In the
latter case the assessment may have been absolutely correct, But, the
reaction ruled out other possible alternatives. The assessment process,
overall, rates a "medium",
HYPOTHESIS II: Success is critically dependent upon effective Speed,
Surprise and Security (hereafter abbreviated as S3)
which includes:
(a) Speed, in terms of the degree to which existing
or ad hoc organizations facilitate the effective
management of time constraints for organizing,
planning, training, and executing the operation;
(b) Surprise, in terms of catching the enemy unaware,
or presenting him with a fait accompli, frus-
trating his ability to respond effectively, and
by utilizing various means of diversion, decep-
tion, weather, terrain, and time in order to
create the conditions most supportive of suc-
cess;
(c) Security in terms of preventing the compromise
of the operation during any phase prior to the
actual rescue (hereafter abbreviated as OPSEC)
Speed
Time is an important element in every operation. From the initiation
of the crisis to its termination, time constraints operate on the
decision makers, the planners, the trainers, and participants, and the
adversary. Time constraints which impact upon combat rescue operations
are particularly restrictive. For example, the availability of forces
restricts the "who". The transportation determines how to get there iind
back. Considerations of timing dictate the "when". These are obvioiu
considerations, but they are important aspects to the management of time,
or speed, that have often been overlooked in the past.
Several examples can illustrate the importance of speed. It takes
time to organize, train, and equip the forces necessary to accomplish the
mission. Creating a special force, as in the Son Tay and Iran cases,
takes months. The use of existing conventional forces drastically reduced
the time, as in Mayaguez, but the inherent complexity of this type of
operation generally demands a more specialized selection. Speed of reac-
tion to a crisis requiring a rescue depends directly upon thisc consider-
ation. Second, the establishment of the necessary command and control
elements and procedures takes time. The use of existing contingency plans
and capabilities within the existing unified and specified commands would
have saved time in both the cases of Iran and Son Tay, The existence of a
special organization (rather than an ad hoc one), in Mayaguez, might have
made for more effective management of the rescue. The Mayaguez used
existing forces and assets, but combined the elements in an ad hoc and
somewhat piecemeal fashion. Third, speed is not necessarily desirable or
required if certain weather conditions, political circumstances or other
factors limit the operation to a peculiar time frame, The preparation
could proceed through "backward planning" for the necessary regulation of
speed. Butlunfortunately, combat rescue operations tend to be more un-,J
tidy. In all three of these cases, speed played a critical part in
affecting the outcome.
Surprise
Surprise is a principle of war in every modern army, and the meaning
is reflected in "IIb" above. In a conventional conflict it is a multi-
plier that can and has changed not only the outcome of the battle, but
the direction of the war and sometimes history. It is one of the most
essential prerequisites in combat rescue operations. The successful
rescue of hostages or prisoners from an armed hostile force is predicated
upon overwhelming the enemy before he has a chance to injure the hostages
or stop the progress of the rescue force. On some occasions, surprise
may not be possible. The adversary may expect a rescue attempt and take
extensive precautionary measures, In that case the element of surprise
must be created through a variety of means: deception; diversion; infil-
tration; or simply presenting the adversaries with a fait accompli facing
overwhelming power before they can react. There are numerous historical
examples which illustrate how surprise operates as a multiplier in mili-
tary operations, and contributes directly to success. In combat rescue
operations it is a neccessity,
Security
Security is also a principle of war and entails the use of all neces-
sary means to prevent the enemy from discovering-the existence and plans
of the operation. It includes active and passive means to frustrate the
adversaries' ability to discover the impending operation as well as in-
.ternal protection to prevent compromise through accident or mistake,
Articulated by Napoleon and Clausewitz, security considerations are not
new, But their importance in combat rescue operations is magnified and
deserves special emphasis throughout the planning training and execution.
I.' HYPOTHESIS TWO - CASE ONE
Speed
In the case of Son Tay, over two months elapsed from the first aware-
ness of the presence of POW's to the appointment of the Task Force Com-.
mander. The rescue idea was not "generated" through a crisis (such as
Mayaguez or Iran). But once the initial go ahead was given at the end
of May, the operation proceeded withrthe priority, emphasis and dedication
of resources which is required for this type of operation.
The Son Tay planners were constrained by a number of time factors
including:. weather "windows"; political considerations (especially si-
mulatneous negotiations for the release of POW's); organizing and training
the forces;.logistical preparations; etc. The fact that the JCS chose to
create a force for this operation made it necessarily slow. The choice
was a deliberate one, based on a calculation of risks and chances of
success. A conventional force in Southeast Asia could have been hastily
assembled and launched but an initial review determined that the use of
local forces was very risky (see "security", below). Therefore, the
speed in preparing for the operation was dictated by the method of opera-
tion selected - to construct a specialized force, not in the area, from
scratch. The use of an existing organization, SACSA, saved time, but the
use of a specially created task force took months to train and equip. The
issue is relevant because the prisoners departed Son Tay around July 13
and the question becomes: between May 9 and July 13, could the U.S. have
assembled a force and launched a rescue into Son Tay? Had the planners
know that July 13 was the limit, is it reasonable to assume that an
attempt could have been made using existing forces and organizations?
But, with no real knowledge of available time, the planners focused on:
preparing a high confidence operation; the weather; and awaited the ".
President's decision relative to the political and diplomatic situation.
Hindsight is clear in supporting the thesis that an existing capability
launched quickly would have had a chance at rescue; whereas any rescue
after 13 July had no chance. Speed in the preparation of a force there-
fore, can be a critical determinant in the reaction to this kind of situa-
tion.
In summary, the slowness of the U.S. effort was greatly caused by the
nonexistence of the required organizations, men and equipment. Because
the effort took five months to complete, the POW rescue opportunity passed.
An existing capability launched quickly at least would have had a chance
to rescue the POWs. The variable of speed is assigned a rating of "low"
for these reasons.
Surprise
There is little doubt that the Son Tay force achieved surprise.21
There were no American fatalities and only two minor injuries. The element
of surprise in this case multiplied the capability of the rescue force
dramatically. The surprise was achieved through no simple means. The
North Vietnamese possessed a sophisticated intelligence network that had
operated for years to the amazement and frustration of American leaders.
The North Vietnamese also possessed a very sophisticated air defense radar
and detection system, as well as a potent air defense capability. The
surprise was created by: excellent o.preoperations security (discussed
below); successful penetration of the North Vietnamese air defenses;
(crash) landing the shock team of the assault force in the center Qf the
prison compound; deceiving the air defense forces and creating deception
through "flare drops".over Haiphong; F-105's to draw SA-2 fire from air
defense gunners near Son Tay, and air strikes (though not deliberately
planned as part of the operation) in the south of North Vietnam. Further,
the surprise created by the rapid, violent and lethal arrival of the
ground force overwhelmed the North Vietnamese and other forces encounter-
ed, The sophisticated preoperations planning facilitated a successful
deployment of the force from Florida to Southeast Asia without detection.
The successful training that preceded it was undetected as a result of the
employment of a variety of deceptions and security measures all of which
contributed to the surprise at Son Tay. Surprise is extremely critical
to this type of operation, because without it, the lives: of the hostages
and rescue team are in serious jeopardy. Son Tay was an excellent example
of the effectiveness of surprise, and rates a "high".
Security
The great emphasis on security was illustrated by the attention to
training security at Eglin AFB in Florida, where the forces were training.
It was known that Soviet Cosmos reconnaissance satellites flew regularly
over Eglin. The Joint Task Force Trainers therefore disassembled the
mock-up of the compound during the Cosmos satellite passes, and even
covered the holes that the posts of the mock-up fit into. Also, wary of
Soviet electronics trawlers positioned in the Gulf of Mexico, the train-
ing was conducted under a deliberate and well-disguised communications
program. The emphasis on security was further illustrated by the fact
that only the four key leaders in the rescue force knew of the raid's
true purpose and destination - even up to the final deployment to
Thailand.
In the operation itself, the team exercised excellent radio security
in the flight across Laos to Son Tay. The tight OPSEC left the entire
chain of command in Southeast Asia in the dark as to the specific nature
of the operation. Only two minor security leaks were even detected: both
were far removed from the scene; and both occurred after the POW's had
been moved. The OPSEC however, was not so inflexible as to preclude
breaking radio silence, or to restrict the occasions for open communica-
tions (the Task Force) that were felt to be necessary. A good balance
was attained between security and judgments, as to when it became neces-
sary to reduce security for some greater purpose. Security and surprise
were reinforcing in this operation.
In short, Son Tay was an excellent example of how surprise and
security can be achieved and contribute to success. Security rates a
"high" in this case.
II, HYPOTHESIS TWO - CASE TWO
Speed
In the Case of Mayaguez, a crisis management team was activiated at
the White House and the Pentagon, and the National Security Council execut-
ed command and control authority through existing lines of command. The
nonavailability of a specially tailored force for the Mayaguez rescue led
the key decision makers to direct the relocation of Marines Corps combat
troops to Thailand for possible employment in the operation. It is not
known whether or not a special rescue force would have been utilized, even
if it had existed, because it appears that a somewhat conventional opera-
tion was envisioned at the time. 22 In any case, the directives demon-
strated the speed with which orders can be issued and units relocated,
equipped, briefed, and prepared for an operation. Along with speed how-
ever, come problems of assessment and planning; which in reality created
a severe problem for the rescue directors.
There were several other factors which could have contributed to a
more successful operation. First, the use of existing contingency plans.
The withdrawl of U.S. forces from both Vietnam and Cambodia was relative-
ly smooth despite the short notice due primarily to the existence of
"off the shelf" plans. No plans existed for the rescue of a ship and crew
in the Gulf of Thailand. Second, the availability of a special unit may
have enabled more detailed planning and coordination rather than spending
valuable time assembling a force and training it for a special operation.
Hindsight exposes a variety of alternatives, some of which might have been
considered at the time. But the evidence clearly indicates that in a
crisis situation, time is on the side of the adversary unless the requisite
forces are very near readiness; or, a delpy in the operation can be tol-
erated by creating the necessary conditions for surprise later on.
In this case the decision makers reacted quickly and utilized avail-
albe forces. The fact that either a special capability did not exist or
a deliberate decision was made not to deploy it suggests that a special
force should be created and decisions regarding its use carefully
evaluated. In this case the crisis management team assembled an ad hoc
force very quickly. (.The Marine elements were trained and deployed as
units, and were not ad hoc. However, their combination with other service
elements in a Joint Task Force was ad hoc and differed from the typical
organization of a Marine assault operation.)
In terms of speed, the operation was extremely rapid. However, the
ad hoc nature of.the organization was weak and the problems were demon-
strated in action. Speed therefore received a rating of "medium".
Surprise
Surprise was achieved in the initial attacks by U.S. war planes on
the Cambodian gunboats. This alerted the Cambodians however, to the
probability of more action against their remaining ships and possibly the
Island or the mainland; especially as numerous missions were flown in a
variety of aircraft in the area, and many conversations on the radio were
in "the open" and not coded. When the assault was launched, the helicop-
ters were exposed for several minutes in their approach to the Island and
did not surprise the defenders. Evidence of the lack of surprise is
apparent from the fact that the defenders opened fire with machineguns
and rocket fire almost simultaneously just as the first wave of helicop-
ters approached the two designated landing. zones on the beaches.23 Three
helicopters were shot down and several others damaged in the first few
minutes, It is not difficult to imagine what would have happened to the
crew of the Mayaguez had they been held captive on the Island. Surprise
was almost nonexistent and rates a "low".
Security
Security for the Mayaguez operation from the President down through
the ground troops was provided by routine measures within the existing
structure and the Crisis Action System. But on the operational level it
was very difficult to conceal the deployment of the Marines, the redirec-
tion of the carrier forces and destroyers, preparations of the B-52 bombers
on Guam, and the other indicators of an impending operation. It has not
been confirmed as to whether or not these movements were detected by the
Cambodians or by countries friendly to them. But it appears reasonable
to assume, after sinking most of the Cambodian navy and numerous recon-
naissance missions, that it was difficult to hide the preparations from
the Cambodians. Surprise and security in this case are clearly related.
The most significant evidence in support of the conclusion that the
Cambodians suspected an operation against Koh Tang Island was recorded in
an observation of the fact that the Cambodians appeared to send reinforce-
ments to the Island between the attack on the guniboats and the assault. 24
The Mayaguez presented a difficult situation. After the first gun-
boat was destroyed the attainment of surprise and the preservation of
security were difficult. But, there were a variety of avoidable mistakes
which would have reduced the difficulty of the problem. The movements,
communications, and reconnaissance were not conducted in adequate secrecy
to assure a high degree of security. In fact the perceptions of the
Cambodians as demonstrated through their reinforcement of the Island and
their coordinated fires on the first assault forces, indicated that
security was not achieved. It therefore receives a rating of "low".
III. HYPOTHESIS TWO - CASE THREE
Speed
According to the Holloway Report, it took from November 4 until Nov-
ember 29 for the U.S. to develop a military response to the Iran embassy
seizure. It took until mid-March to develop a reasonable capability to
rescue the fifty-three men and women in Tehran with a high confidence of
success. The requirements of a favorable outcome, in addition to cap-
ability, were weather and light conditions, assessments, and the creation
of artificial conditions for surprise through political deception at the
highest levels. The use of an ad hoc organization under the control of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff was similar to the Son Tay operation and shared
many of the same aspects. First, as in Son Tay, the Chairman of the JCS
became the commander for the operation and supervised the direction of the
effort through the creation of a Joint Task Force whose commander reported
directly to the Chairman.25 Second, like Son Tay, the Chairman chose to
use an unconventional approach rather than utilize existing organizations,
plans and procedures. For example, one highly appropriate plan existed
which called forth detailed requirements for people and equipment (includ-
ing security procedures and interagency communications which were very
problematic for the ad hoc organization).26
The ad hoc approach led to a number of delays and problems. The
most notable were the difficulties in coordinating the effort; the lack
of a proper seciruty standard operating procedures; and the failure to
call upon the widest possible range of active and retired experts
(especially those accomplished in long range helicopter operations) and
submit the final plan to a thorough review. A non-ad hoc approach would
have been much faster and might have avoided most of these problems. Not
only was the reaction slow, but the nature of the response created anum-
ber of serious problems. For these reasons speed is rated as "low".
Surprise
The arrival of the force at the Desert One site was apparently
achieved without the knowledge of the Iran government, and the Iranian de-
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fensive forces were not activated. However, the surprise was quickly
lost and the operation endangered by the arrival of Iranian civilians and
the escape of one Iranian from the area. How the compromise might have
affected the remaining phases is subject to conjecture, but the risk of a
loose eyewitness was real.28
It is a tribute to the personnel involved that a force of this size
and composition could have been trained, deployed, and launched halfway
around the world without detection. Surprise was achieved at least
initially at Desert One and it rates a "high". The Iran case was a good
example of how artificial conditions of surprise can be created through
deliberate means. The President supported the plan and apparently pursued
a deliberately deceptive plan to encourage the Iranian government and
embassy guards to relax their security, aid perhaps the radar and air
defense forces as well. The President supported the plan and apparently
pursued a deliberately deceptive plan to encourage the Iranian government
and embassy guards to relax their security, and perhaps the radar and air
defense forces as well. The President's public statements on the "non-
use" of military forces and the supplementary justifications by public
statements of top Pentagon experts contributed to a perception that the
U.S. would not attempt a rescue.29 It was both too risky and infeasible.
Most experts on government and the public were surprised by the attempted
rescue. Statements by Iranian authorities carried on the wire services
after the operation indicated that they were equally surprised. How the
surprise would have paid off at the embassy is speculative, but the alleged
confidence in the operation was so great that the President felt that the
Desert One phase was the most difficult! If the surprise transferred to
the embassy phase, it would have greatly aided the operation there.
Security
The security throughout the Iran rescue operation was excellent. It
was based on a concept of minimal knowledge of the operation. Few person-
nel knew the entire plan. A complete plan was not even written until after
the operation was over, All those involved were generally limited to
their specific areas of involvement, and every facet of the plan, includ-
ing training, was rigidly compartmentalized. The Holloway Report con-
cluded that the excessive security was the weak link in the plan there
is such a thing as too much security. The overriding concern with opera-
tions security created problems in several other areas: the number of
helicopters; limited rehearsals; contingency preparations (especially com-
munications); the selection of the Desert One location; and a number of
equipment and training considerations. The balance between operations
security and other requirements leaned heavily in the favor of security.
Security rates a "high" but the evidence suggests that security might be
inversely proportional to other variables, like training,
Security appears to be closely related to surprise in this case as
well. Among the planners security was perceived as the key to assuring
surprise. The plan was overshadowed by the fact that the embassy was
within the city and large numbers of hostile and armed Iranians could be
assembled very quickly. If security was not assured (no leaks and no
active or passive enemy detection) the embassy could easily become an
ambush. Extracting the force under such conditions would require a major
escalation in the commitment of forces and numerous other problems would
emerge.
In summary, the Iran case was an excellent example of how a high de-
gree of surprise and security can be attained. The speed of preparation
was slow and the ad hoc nature of the effort created numerous time con-
suming and unneccessary problems. The ratings of "high" for surprise and
security, and "low" for speed are assigned for these reasons. Additional-
ly, future studies might focus on the relationship of these three variables
in more detail as the evidence indicates that there are trade-offs and
mutual reinforcements among them.
HYPOTHESIS III: Success is critically dependent upon effective
COMMAND, CONTROL, and COMMUNICATIONS. (Referred to
as C3) which includes:
(a) Command that is unified (with clear lines of
authprity), qualified, and properly positioned;
(b) Control that is adequate to regulate the per-
formance of the mission, including :contingen-
cies;
(c) Communications that utilize the most advanced
equipment, and which are based on effective
techniques, procedures, and redundant systems.
These three variables are critical to every operation, but their
importance in combat rescue operations is magnified for several reasons.
First, the rescue force generally does not possess the capability by
nature of its purpose to operate independently. It is dependent upon out-
side reaction and support in cases of major contingencies, such as trans-
portation, failures, ambush, etc. A small unit with limited capabilities
in hostile territory has a vital need for reliable communications, and
effective command and control by the higher authority. Second, the sen-
sitive nature of these operations necessitates their control by the high-
est authorities of the government. The detailed control of the operation,
generally over great distances, is facilitated through the establishment
of clear and unified lines of authority and decision-making, and the
provision of the necessary means to exercise it. Third, during the execu-
tion of the operation the critical aspects of speed and timing necessitate
the best possible C3. On the grand strategic scale, the political and
diplomatic implications of the operation are heavily dependent upon
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communications as well. In summary all three are especially important
in combat rescue operations.
In all three cases, the effectiveness of the C3 contributed in identi-
fiable ways to the success or failure of the operations. The command
orders: the control regulates; and the communications provide the central
nervous system. A failure in any one of these can jeapordize the entire
effort. In the first two cases, command and control are so intertwined
as to be difficult to separate. As such they will be discussed together.
In the Iran case, communications are also very interrelated and all three
will be discussed together.
HYPOTHESIS THREE - CASE ONE
Command and Control
In this case, the chain of command extended from the President ++
JCS +-+ TF Commander *-+ Unit Commanders (air and ground). Son Tay was
unique in that it was the first military operation in American history
coordinated under the direct control of the Office of the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff,31 The unified and specified commands of PACOM and
the theatre service commands in Southeast Asia were not informed of the
nature of the operation (except for a few key Commanders like CINCPAC),
and yet were tasked to support it and not interfere with it. They exer-
cised no command and control authority over the force except for partic-
ular elements which were designated within their commands to support
the rescue such as air strikes. Judgments as to the efficacy of this
structure are debatable in theoretical as well as practical terms, but it
is certainly costly in terms of the speed with which the forces that are
necessary can be selected and prepared. Operationally, once the mission
was on its way to Son Tay, the Task Force Commander was located at Da
Nang and was simultaneously exercising command and control, and was in
direct communication with the JCS authorities at the National Military
Command Center at the Pentagon. MG Blackburn and the SACSA organization
were responsible for overseeing the preparation and deployment of the
force, but once the operation began, the responsibility was transferred
to the JCS and the President.
The commanders and leaders in this case were well-trained and well-
qualified. BG Manor, the Task Force Commander (TF CO) had established a
clear line of authority for command and control of forces headed for Son
Tay. LTC Syndor was in charge of the air elements and COL Simons in
charge of ground operations. Every member of the force was well-briefed
on the chain of command and prepared for a wide variety of reactive
measures to a whole host of contingencies. The written plan's annex
contained a single section on hand and arm, flare, and light signals that
was eight pages long.32
The force was tested to the utmost when the ground commander landed
in the wrong location in the first few minutes. The assistant commander,
and second in line, automatically took over and executed "Plan Green".
(CO killed, lost, wrong place, etc). The operation continued successfully
despite this major error.
The command and control preparations were extensive. Every man knew
the face of every other man, and exactly where and when each was supposed
to move during the rescue. Additionally, each man was clearly identified
with his rank and insignia. The command and control within the rescue
team broke down only once. Near the end of the operation, one helicopter
never received the order to depart the area and was almost left behind.
Above the events at Son Tay, BG Manor was supposed to have C3 of the
operation for his command post at "Monkey Mountain" in Da Nang. But once
the operation was launched from Thailand his control was weak and tenuous.
His communications system failed and left him with after the fact infor-
mation, and little control over the situation at Son Tay. Events were
so unclear, he eventually abandoned his position and flew to Thailand to
meet the returning rescue force and confirm the results of the raid.
Above him at the National Military Command Center (NMCC) Pentagon author-
ities were at the mercy of the reports from Manor. There were delays and
confusion in reporting; and had a major problem developed at Son Tay, the
NMCC would have known about it only well after the fact. To illustrate
the tenuous control, the TF CO had added a flight of escort F-105 jets to
the mission as a diversion, one of which was shot down, The JCS level
control of the operation was so tenuous that they had not been informed
of the augmentation to the plan.
Overall, the excellent C3 within the rescue force facilitated the
relatively smooth rescue attempt. But, the TF CO was neither in a good
position, nor properly equipped with proper and redundant communications
to assure,positive control. With the NMCC dependent on Manor in turn,
little or no rapid response capability existed from above. Under what
conditions would the President have ordered an abort? A potentially dis-
astrous command and control situation was averted only by the thorough
33preparation and training of the rescue force. Rating command and con-
trol is difficult because within the force it was nearly flawless and
the problems above the level of the TF were not in reality critical to
the operation, though they were potentially important, The performance
.of the command and control, although problematic, should therefore bhe
rated "high" based on the function of these variables on events at Son
Tay.
Communications
The communications plan for the Son Tay rescue was very complex.
The -preoperation links with the!Air Weather Service at Takhli Royal
AFB foretold the problems this complexity would cause. The TF relied on
communications support in Southeast Asia to support the operation. Be-
cause some of the equipment was not available where expected, extensive
efforts were required to assemble and operate equipment for last minute
communications.
BG Manor's headquarters was established at "Monkey Mountain" near
Da Nang and was designed to monitor the transmissions of the rescue forces
via a link-up with two EC-121 air craft orbiting over the Tonkin Gulf,
along with a visual display of the progress of the concurrent air diver-
sions. The system failed shortly after the operation began. The TF CO
could not speak to the rescue team leaders. His ability to monitor
their transmissions was fragmented and weak. The original communications
concept was to monitor their all the frequencies of the Son Tay force
rather than complicate the operation with a requirement for long range
reports and to communicate orders only as necessary. The plan failed in
execution. The impact of extensive jamming of North Vietnamese radio
frequencies may have affected American frequencies as well. The equip-
ment in the EC-121's, as well as the visual displays at Manor's headquar-
ters also failed. An otherwise excellent concept was shortcircuited by
the communications failure in practice.
On the ground at Son Tay, 92 radios on five different frequencies
operated successfully at Son Tay and assured the rapid and successful
assault. The coordination of the operation across a wide range of
different frequencies and radios, especially in-flight communications
with the supporting aircraft was excellent. After one F-105 was shot
down, the rescue force coordinated and completed a successful rescue of
the pilots from hostile territory in Laos as they returned from Son Tay.
This incident illustrated the flexibility of the rescue force's plans
and equipment. The failure of communications above this level did not
affect the operation significantly, The near perfect insertion, assault,
and return were facilitated by the effective communications planning,
equipment, procedures and techniques. Communications rates a "high" for
an excellent plan and execution with the rescue force despite problems
above.
Overall, the C3 of the Son Tay operation was simultaneously excellent
and poor, At the excellent end, the integrity of the rescue force pro-
vided the key to success, At the other end, any major contingency at
Son Tay would have left the force to their own means and the TF CO and the
NCA out of control of events, at least initially. Such a situation could
have disastrous consequences for the prisoners and the rescue force. But,
the excellent performance of the force in reality led to an assignment of
"high" ratings to all three variables in the hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS THREE - CASE TWO
Command and Control
Command and control in Mayaquez was established under more constrain-
ed circumstances than in the other two cases. Consequently, the President
used existing units and structures and operated through the existing
unified and specified commanders. The chain of command extended from the
President *-+ JCS +-+ CINCPAC +-+ CINCPACFLT -+ USSAG/7th AF (the U.S. Sup-
port Activity Group Thailand Commander wore two hats and was designated
the TF and on the scene commander). The rescue operation entailed the use
of Naval, Air Force, Army air, and Marines units. Modern sophisticated
communications enabled the President to speak almost instantly with near-
ly anyone he desired. The existence of similar excellent communications
means in the theatre of operations should have enabled the TF CO to
establish effective communications, and through that system exercise his
direct command and control of the operation. But, there were serious
problems encountered as a result of communications difficulties. The
inability to communicate properly and evaluate the assessment of enemy
positions and strength on Koh Tang Island has already been mentioned.
But there were other equally serious command and control problems.
The choice of TF CO and pilots was criticized in several post opera-
tions reports; not for judgment, but for the lack of specialized exper-
ience that operations of this type require. The Air Force Commander
designated to oversee the operation was not an expert on Marine amphibious
or airborne assault operations. The Air Force helicopters and pilots
designated to fly the Marines to Koh Tang were not assault trained or
oriented. There were discussions and disagreements between the two ser-
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vices on the assault plan.. The problems that were encountered under-
score the importance of experience, especially in time-constrained situa-
tions.
The command and control within the theatre was generally well-
structured and tactically sound. However, the communications coordination
problem (discussed below) coupled with the lack of preparations for con-
tingencies, quickly combined to weaken the command and control over
events on Koh Tang Island. The direction of the air strikes against the
mainland, and the control of the assault on the Mayaguez were executed
without significant difficulty. The focus here is upon events on the
Island.
In the actual operation the importance of command and control was
clearly demonstrated in several ways. First, the lead assault wave lost
three helicopters and approximately fifteen killed before the first Marine
landed on the beaches. The Commander of the ground force was landed at
the wrong location and was separated from the other two units, which were
themselves pinned down on opposite sides.of the Island. The heavy enemy
fire made the beachhead a very tenuous position as the three separated
elements fought to establish a toe-hold. The separation of the Commander
from the main forces, and the loss of most of the communications cap-
ability on the two beachheads led to a severe state of confusion among
the Americans. A similar situation of confusion,' as might be expected,
existed in the FT CO's airborne command post. The situation on the Island
was desperate. The loss of command and control reduced the ability of the
TF CO to evaluate what was needed to improve the situation, and then to
provide it. Air observation efforts eventually produced a picture of
events. Communications to the island were reestablished through a series
of radio patches and links. The confusion was compounded by the inability
of the ground commander to see his own forces or the enemy's, and since
there were no detailed maps of the Island available, (only reconnaissance
photographs adopted for tactical use) navigation on the Island was
imprecise. The confusion was shared by the crisis management team at the
Pentagon. The problems with command and control were serious and had an
unfavorable impact on the operation. For the reasons discussed here they
are rated "low".
Communications
The preparation for the operation was characterized by a large number
of unsecured communications, especially between observation aircraft and
the planning headquarters, During the operation, the situation worsened,
and some of the sensitive communications within the theatre were "in the
clear", The problem was partially attributable to the equipment, and
partially to the planning. On the Island the ground CO eventually fought
his way to one of the beachheads and began to reestablish control of his
forces. Air strikes were coordinated and directed against the enemy
positions. The radio equipment and the plan for its use did not permit
rapid and easy communication between the airborne HQ, tactical aircraft,
and the ground forces because of the variety of unintegrated radio types
FM, UHF, VHF. In addition to radio incompatibility, the lack of coordi-
nated frequencies compounded the difficulty, even when the radios were
compatible. The complexity of an operation with multi-channel and multi-
type communications equipment necessiates a well-coordinated plan. This
.had not been accomplished. The fortuitous availability of an Army Forward
Air Controller aircraft, with a variety of communications capabilities,
aided the situation by establishing communications with the air and
ground elements and coordinating the supporting air strikes,
In summary, the command, control and communications situation proved
itself to be poor due to the lack of prior planning for coordination of
existing systems, coordination for contingencies, and the identification
and preparation of potentially useful (and available) equipment. There
was no evidence of any breakdown in communications above the TF level.
The communications problems (as the nerves of the operation) contributed
to the serious command and control problems as well, and the Pentagon
crisis managers shared the confusion for a time. The supporting air
strikes permitted the assault force to hold on, and bought time for the
second wave from Thailand to arrive. Meanwhile, the crew was released
and the order to withdraw was given. Additional forces were landed to aid
and cover in the final withdrawl. The combination of problems rates the
performance of command, control and communications overall as "low".
HYPOTHESIS THREE - CASE THREE
Command, Control and Communication
In the Iran case, the chain of command extended from the President +-+
JCS +-+ Joint Task Force CO +-+ Subordinate TF CO's (Air and Ground force
Commanders).35 The force was organized through an independent TF organi-
zation with channels of C3 outside the normal existing route, and similar
to the Son Tay scheme. This ad hoc organization created severe diffi-
culties for the operation and hindered the success of the mission.
Above the JTF level, the command and control channels were clearly
established and understood. The President was in direct communication
with the JTF CO throughout the operation, and the various aircraft pilots
had the capability to link up with the JTF CO or even the President, were
it deemed desirable or necessary.36 The ability of the President to
exercise command and control of the operation down to the lowest level
was illustrated by the President's discussion with the commanders
at Desert One regarding the decision to abort. But the same clear command
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and control did not exist within the JTF. This problem is clearly
illustrated in two distinct phases - the penetration to Desert One, and
the refueling operation.
First, problems began for the helicopter force about two hours into
the flight, The helicopters had taken off from the Nimitz in a loose form-
ation (in pairs, and the four pairs staggered) and they were to follow a
complex, dangerous, and highly demanding route. Since the dust problem
had not been anticipated, there were no provisions for communications -
even though a sophisticated system of light signals between aircraft had
been designed and rehearsed. The authorized procedures allowed only for
the flight commander to speak to the JTF CO; in the case of internal
contingencies, only visual signals were authorized. The security was so
strict that radio listening silence was not to be broken under even abort
circumstances. As a result, the combination of dust and maintenance prob-
lems caused the flight commander to loose control of the mission..
Further, these problems only became obvious upon arrival at Desert One
hours later. Helicopter six aborted after a warning light and visual
inspection revealed a cracked rotor blade. Helicopter five aborted after
an electrical failure and concerns for safety in the dust clouds. The
pilot later stated that he would have continued rather than returning to
the carrier had he known of the clear weather conditions at Desert One,
and an end of the dust about twenty-five minutes further into the flight.
The deputy flight commander was on helicopter five, and could not notify
the flight commander of his decision. Upon arrival at Desert One, heli-
copter two was confirmed as having an :unrepariable hydraulic leak. With
only five helicopters available to continue the mission, (a minimum of
six was required) the President authorized the decision to terminate
the mission. The overriding concern for operations security OPSEC led to
the severe restrictions on communications. The motivation was good
surprise was absolutely essential to the mission's success. However, the
sacrifice of communications flexibility and control, cost the operation
severely.38
The second illustration of command and control failure was at Desert
One. Confusion existed because of the delayed and staggered arrival of
the helicopters. The flight commander was the last to arrive. The deputy
commander had returned to the Nimitz, The Air Force officer designated
commander for Desert One, had been designated only a day or two before
the operation and had no real capability for coping with the situation he
faced there, even under the best of circumstances: darkness; the noise
from 12 helicopter engines and 24 C-130 engines; swirling dust; and no
alternate C3 means for managing the refueling operation. There was no
designated command post; no clear identification of those authorized to
give orders and relay messages; and no alternate means to deal with coi"-
tingencies - runners, prearranged codes. etc.
The late arrival of the helicopter flight commander and the late
assessment of the helicopter situation left the leaders with little dark-
ness in which to react. (Darkness was believed to be essential to cover
the move to the "Mountain Hideout".) Even-after the decision to abort was
made, a future attempt at rescue was not completely ruled out. Provisions
were made to destroy evidence of the U.S. presence, and even temporarily
fly the Iranian detainees out of the countries. With effective C3 at
Desert One it is likely that the abort could have been executed without
incident, and a second attempt made the following night or even a few
weeks later. But after the crash of the helicopter and the C-130 at the
site any second attempt became even more difficult because the hostages
were removed to separate locations and the Iranians greatly improved
their security. The degree to which the C3 problem contributed to the
accident itself is unclear, but the C3 problems after the accident were a
reflection of the poor conditions at Desert One. Intact helicopters were
abandoned without executing destruction plans and sensitive and classified
equipment, plans, maps, and even money were not removed from the
abandoned aircraft.39
Throughout the operation, and at all levels, the best communications
equipment available was on hand. There were systems that could have been
used that would have given the force an even wider capability - an advance
weather mission; a "pathfinder" to lead the helicopter flight; or secure
special frequency communications with the helicopter flight. The tech-
nology performed well. The techniques and procedures in the use of that
technology were lacking, as were the command and control of the penetra-
tion and the refueling site.
In summary, the technical means of communications and the existing
capabilities were excellent. Communications therefore rates a "high".
The restrictions on the use of communications were part of the command and
control plan and the problems in those two areas are clear. The
dust storm was a remote possibility and was difficult to foresee. Given
its major impact on the operation, the rating of command and control
which should have been capable of dealing with the suspected dust
phenomena,. is at best a "medium".
HYPOTHESIS IV: Success is critically dependent upon TRANSPORTATION,
which includes travel to and from the objectives(s)
with reliable and tested systems.
Simply stated (but complicated in reality) this is the transporta-
tion problem. In all three cases helicopters and aircraft were employed
in transporting the rescue forces to and from the objective or in sup-
porting the moves with logistical or tactical aircraft.
There are several problems associated with the use of helicopters
and airplanes .on these kinds of operations. First, penetrating foreign
airspace secretly is difficult, especially when sophisticated detection
means are available. Second, aircraft, particularly helicopters, are
highly vulnerable to rocket and gunfire. Third, the long distances
typically associated with these missions can tax the maximum capabilities
of the pilots, fuel, and maintenance systems. There are a multitude of
other considerations for each unique situation but there does seem to be
a pattern in that transportation decisions contribute to the outcomes in
a very significant manner. The rescue force must get to the objective,
and without being discovered. The force must be extracted along with any
rescued prisoners/hostages and must include the capability to handle
casualties. Third, the group must return to friendly territory. These
problems and considerations make the transportation variable a very
important variable. The hypothesis states that if the transportation
systems are not tested and reliable, then the performance of the opera-
tion will be degraded.
In the following three cases the transportation problem was address-
ed in three entirely different ways, although the similarities are strik-
ing.
HYPOTHESIS FOUR - CASE ONE
In the case of Son Tay, the transportation aspect of the operation
was a near-perfect planning and execution model. The Task Force Command-
er was an Air Force pilot with hundreds of hours of flying experience with
all kinds of aircraft and a special expertise with helicopter operations.
He handpicked the crews and support teams based on their experience and
dependability and the well-researched demands that he anticipated would
be required. The HH-53 transport helicopter (and one AH-3) was selected
based on its proven performance and reliability. (The AH-3 was less
desirable but it was the only helicopter both large enough to carry enough
troops and small enough to crash-land safely within the prison compound.)
The helicopters were augmented with state-of-the-art navigational aids,
electronics, and extra crewmen. The crews flew the helicopters in a total
of several thousand pilot hours in order to gain the necessary expertise
for long flights at low levels, and under conditions of darkness, frequent
maneuvers and tuns; and the hazards of flight over unfriendly territory.
Back-up helicopters were provided to accompany the mission in case of
failures. A total of three were needed and five were provided. A C-130
navigational airplane (pathfinder) led the flight of helicopters on the
circuitous simulated route during training and in the actual operation.
It provided the additional benefits of weather warning, communications
back-up, and assistance in the event of contingencies.
The only significant problems in the actual operation were related
to matters of command and control. The command helicopter landed at the
wrong location and one helicopter was almost left behind. But overall,
the transportation was excellent and rates a "high".
HYPOTHESIS FOUR - CASE TWO
In this case the natural choice of means for transportation was
helicopters. The choice was inecessitated by the order for a quick cap-
ability to assault the Island and the.nonavailability of amphibious land-
ing craft. They may have been chosen had they been available within the
time limitations, but the only real choice was helicopters. However, the
number of helicopters and the location of friendly bases was also limited.
The Task Force Commander was therefore limited in his scheme of operations.
He chose to fly the Marines from bases in Thailand, and to assault in two
waves with all available helicopters, The second wave would be inserted
after a turn around flight of over three hours.
There were several problems with the concept. If the first wave
encountered serious opposition, reinforcements were over three hours away.
Second, if any helicopters were lost in the first wave the ability to
extract the forces quickly or reinforce the Island would be proportionate-
ly degraded.
In addition to conceptual problems, there were practical problems
associated with the tactics of the employment of the transportation
systems. There was some discussion before the operation regarding inser-
tion tactics. A combat insertion called for either a low level concealed
approach or a "drop out of the sky" quick insertion - both accomplished
with as much surprise as possible. In addition, either tactic called
for the support of the insertion with planned naval gun and aerial fires.
Finally, the art of the insertion required a quick landing, rapid offload
of the troops, and a speedy departure - the requisite skills are very
different from normal take off's and landing's.40 Air Force pilots were
designated to fly the mission over complaints by Marines Corps personnel.
The pilots lacked the combat insertion experience to adhere to doctrine
or the polished skills associated with the "art" of insertion.
In the actual operation the helicopters approached in clear view of
the Island and three were shot down within a few seconds of the begin-
ning of the assault. Two others were damaged. In the smoke and confu-
sion, the ground commander was inserted farther down the beach and was
isolated from his units. The forces were split on each side of the Island
with a strong enemy force in between, and fighting for a toe-hold on the
beaches. Eventually the force was withdrawn after naval gunfire and
tactical air fires from Coral Sea aircraft stabilized the situation long
enough to extract the force.
In summary, the transportation performance in the case of Mayaguez
was poor, for a variety of controlled and uncontrolled reasons. It is
therefore rated "low", The transportation issue in this type of opera-
tion is much more than a simple ticket to and from the objective. It
requires an adequate number of aircraft (or vehicles) with appropriate
back-up, special training to assure reliable utilization of the systems,
and well-established command and control means.
HYPOTHESIS FOUR - CASE THREE
In the Iran case, the planners recognized the seriousness of the
transportation problem from the start. Iran was thousands of miles from
the nearest U.S. base, adjacent to the Soviet Union, and Tehran itself
was over 550 miles from the Persian Gulf. The embassy was located in the
middle of densely populated and unfriendly city. The guards and the
population were well-armed. The situation presented a seemingly impos-
sible task of transporting to and from the embassy successfully. To
their credit, the planners developed a workable, however complex, plan.
Helicopters and C-130 transports were again chosen for the transportation
means.
Without speculating on the plan beyond Desert One, the transportation
issue up to that point was flawed. The excessive preoccupation with OPSEC
precluded the incorporation of reasonable contingency procedures into the
transportation plans. Equipment failures are reasonable to expect on long
and arduous flights that tax the capabilities of the men and equipment
to the utmost. Prohibiting radio (or whatever means is required) communi-
cations in failure or abort circumstances is a poor procedure in terms of
equipment failure expectations alone - not counting the other problems it
causes, as were discussed earlier. The means existed to provide a secure,
"last resort" type of communications capability which whould have not
greatly increased the danger to security.
A second failure was the choice of the number of helicopters and the
margins of failure built into the operation. A Time report claimed that
a study was made of the flight records of that particular helicopter as
a basis for the decision to send eight and expect only a twenty-five per
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cent loss. But, there is a wealth of practical experience among those
who have worked with the RH-53, and many have criticized the margin as far
too small for a flight profile which pushed the aircraft to the limits of
42its performance. Additional fuel was available for more helicopters
without a major change in plan. Hindsight is of course very clear and
the debate will continue in and out of military circles, but the twenty-
five per cent margin is risky by any standard in light of the fact that
this type of operation is very risky and complex to start with; and high
confidence is attained through systems redundancy and margins of safety
that are wider.
A third problem was associated with the method chosen for navigation
to the Desert One site. The C-130 pathfinder was a proven navigational
method for leading helicopters on exactly this type of flight as was
demonstrated at Son Tay. The decision not to use it was apparently based
primarily on security considerations and confidence in the sophisticated..
navigational aids on the aircraft. The use of the C-130 would have pro-
vided some protection against four remote but potentially serious con-
tingencies: (1) lead the flight through unforeseen and difficult weather
conditions; (2) a single lead aircraft with extensive electronic cap-
abilities would have provided a quicker and more unified movement to pre-
vent delays which would impact on the daylight problem; (3) the lead air-
craft would arrive first, assuring the arrival of key leaders and equip-
ment for operations at the site; and (4) a lead aircraft would have been
able to aid an organized withdrawal from Iranian airspace in the event of
detection or cancellation of the mission.
There were many positive aspects to the transportation issue in
addition to the serious problems. The pilots and crews were well-trained,
experienced, and proved their capabilities despite the dust problem. The
failure of the equipment was beyond their control however, and of course
caused the cancellation of the mission. There were other pluses as well.
Overall, the transportation hypothesis had great relevance and
applicability to the performance of the rescue operation. There were
severe, mostly avoidable, problems which degrades the outcome and which
receives a rating of between "medium" and "low".
HYPOTHESIS V: Success is critically dependent upon the rescue force
and includes:
(a) the selection of adequate forces, including the
use of state-of-the-art technology and equipment;
and,
(b) the proper training of the forces, and which con-
sists of integrated training for all operation-
al elements, full rehearsals, comprehensive
evaluations, and retraining.
The arrival of the force at the prescribed location is critical, but
the performance of the force becomes equally critical. In all three
cases the quality of the forces was excellent. The motivation, courage,
discipline, and dedication of the people involved were clearly demon-
strsted throughout these operations. The questions raised in this
hypothesis concern tbe manner in which the forces were organized and
trained. The focus of this hypothesis is primarily upon the ground
forces. The pilots were discussed in the previous hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS FIVE - CASE ONE
In the Son Tay case, the ground force was composed entirely of spe-
cial forces experts and volunteers. Team members were trained individual-
ly and then cells and groups were integrated into more comprehensive
exercises. A final comprehensive rehearsal and evaluation led to several
major modifications in the plan (the addition of a helicopter gunship, the
use of F-105 fighter airplanes for diversions, etc.) as well as preventing
the problems from surfacing later during the operation. The rescue force
performed almost flawlessly. The team had spent hundreds of hours pre-
paring for the mission and were prepared for nearly any conceivable sit-
uation. The equipment accumulated for the operation included specialized
visual aids that were not even in the military supply system. The
combination of personnel, equipment, integrated training, and a full
evaluation and retraining resulted in an outstanding performance at Son
Tay. Force selection and training in this case clearly rates "high".
HYPOTHESIS FIVE - CASE TWO
In the Mayaguez case, the operation was compressed in time and there
was no opportunity for handpicking people, specialized training, the
assembly of specialized advanced equipment or full integrated training.
the assembly of specialized advanced equipment or full integrated train-
ing. However, the use of an existing unit of trained and capable Marines
avoided many of the problems encountered when a unit is created from ,
scratch - unit integrity especially. The Marine units were disciplined,
had good leadership and training, and functional equipment. They were
briefed and had planned a rapid assault on the suspected hostage com-
pound, and even had time to conduct limited dry run rehearsals on the
insertion and subsequent actions. The problems on Koh Tang Island were
more a mismatch of forces than problems with the Marine forces them-
selves. Because the enemy forces were much stronger than expected, the
assault was rapidly converted into a hasty defense. Once the notification
of the release of the prisoners was received, the operation turned into a
withdrawal under fire.
It is not suggested here that only specialized forces can or should
be used in these operations. All units conduct specialized training
beyond basic soldiering and the Marines committed to the rescue opera-
tion were fully capable of performing the mission. The lack of adequate
time to conduct full integrated training was the most severe shortcoming,
particularly regarding the tactical insertion. A full -comprehensive
review of the plan would likely have revealed the vulnerability of the
force to unforeseen contingencies and other plans or alternatives con-
.sidered. For these reasons the force selection rates "high", and the
force training "high" to "medium".
HYPOTHESIS FIVE - CASE THREE
In the case of the Iran rescue, a full evaluation of the performance
of the ground forces cannot be made. However, the force was specially
trained and in a high state of readiness for the rescue.. There were prob-
lems at the Desert One site that were the result of other failures dis-.
cussed in previous hypotheses, but the ground forces were not really
involved. (A full scale dress rehearsal would likely have revealed the
problems that would be encountered at the site and appropriate corrective
measures adopted.)
The ground forces were well-prepared for the operation. Although
they were not tested during the actual conduct of a rescue, the team and
the decision makers shared a high confidence in their capabilities. For
this reason the force selection and training rate a "high".
TABULATION OF RESULTS
Table I below reflects the results of the five hypotheses tested
above. With the possible exception of Hypothesis Five - Case Three
(because the operation was not completed) all of the hypotheses were
appropriate to the operations. A tentative "finding" therefore, is that
the hypotheses are relevant to these operations as a class of phenomena,
and there are variables which cut across and through the unique and dis-
tinguishing characteristics of the individual cases. The detailed
analysis of the variables .and the cases, and their value will be
conducted in the next chapter.
HYPOTHESIS RATING FOR EACH CASE
HII HIII
CASE ONE L-0
CASE TWO L
CASE THREE 0
L X X X X X
0 L L L L L
L X X 0 0 X
X = High
0 = Medium
L = Low
TABLE I
HIV
a----b
X X
X O-X
L-O X X
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CHAPTER FOUR
ANALYSES AND CONCLUSIONS
The first problem to be addressed in this chapter is the formation
of a workable definition of "success and failure" in combat rescue opera-
tions. The second problem will be to apply the definition to the three
cases and determine a rank order for the cases; from the most successful
to the least successful. The third problem will be to combine the
analyses of the variables and hypotheses in Chapter Three with the defini-
tion and case-ranking analysis in this chapter, and attempt to derive
conclusions for the results.
Problem One
A workable, widely applicable and generally acceptable definition of
"success and failure" is an evasive creature. Many different studies
have wrestled with this problem. In this study the challenge is not to
measure success or failure precisely, but rather to propose a sufficient-
ly adequate definition which establishes a relative order of success among
the cases. The definition must also be independent of the hypotheses
tested in the previous chapter - otherwise the Guttman type scaling would
be invalid. This is because the independent variables hypothesized to be
the causes of success and failure must not be part of the definitions of
them. (Otherwise, the analysis would be tautological and the analysis
would only prove itself.)
The following comparative two part definition is offered.
A combat rescue operation is the most successful if:
(a) the primary objective is accomplished, i.e., the hostages/
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prisoners are rescued with minimum casualties to the force
and the P!rescued"; and,
(2) certain operational steps are completed in the "best" man-
ner.
These "steps" are arbitrarily established as bench marks or major phases
in the operation and are:
(a) deployment from staging areas to the objective;
(b) activities at the objective; and
(c) redeployment from the objective.
"Best" is evaluated by examining the number of serious problems and
challenges encountered, how the forces reacted to the problems, and how
the resolution :or nonresolution of the problem impacted on the next
phase. This is not intended to be a formal evaluation but rather a rela-
tive comparison and grading of the cases.
Before applying the definition to the cases, two issues need to be
clarified. First, the results of the Mayaguez are somewhat counter-
intuitive because all of the crewmembers and the ship were rescued! But
this author suggests that there was little demonstratable correlation
between the release of the crew and the Koh Tang Island rescue operation.
The most convincing evidence of this fact is provided by Captain Miller
(Mayaguez Captain) in his testimony before Congress.2 In his testimony
he explained his treatment during captivity and the events surrounding
the release from 7his perspective. He felt that the resease was the re-
sult of the bombing attacks on the gunboats and the perceived threat to
the limited Cambodian navy, air force, and port facilities of the fledg-
ing revolutionary government. The second source of convincing evidence
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is the fact that upon close analysis of the General Accounting Office
Report's chronology, as well as several others, 3 it becomes evident that
the release of the crew occurred almost simultaneously with arrival
of the Marines. If one believes that the Cambodian decision making
processes were sufficiently rapid to make the release decision based on
the assault, then perhaps there was a correlation. But there is no:
evidence to suggest this was the case. In fact, the Cambodian government
had made a public radio broadcast stating their intention to release the
ship (before the assualt began). The statement was discounted by U.S.
decision makers because there was no mention of the crew.4 In conclusion,
it appears that something else, perhaps the bombing (or even diplomatic
pressure), caused the Cambodian government to release the crew - not the
assault on the Island.
The second issue concerns the level of difficulty of each operation.
Major General Gray for example, felt that it was difficult to compare the
three cases because the requirements and problems associated with each were
widely divergent. Additionally, where there were similar problems, as
in maintaining security, the operation were "light years" apart in
the degree of difficulty. Is it fair to conclude that one operation was
more or less successful than another in light of these differences? This
author would argue that the three cases are- relatively equal. The three
cases presented were challenging circumstances to U.S. decision makers,
planners and participants. Iran is analyzed and treated here as an
incomplete case. It is reasonable to compare the Son Tay operation with
the completed portion of the Iran operation and conclude they were both
very complex, demanding and challenging. In any case, it would be very
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complex, demanding and challenging. In any case, it would be very
unusual for the participants to accept a weighting scheme to address
the problem. Can you imagine COL Simons (Son Tay) and COL Beckwith (Iran)
in the same room arguing that one case was more difficult that the other?
The cases will be treated as equally complex, challenging, and difficult
in the application of the definition in the following section.
Problem Two
In terms of the first part of the definition of
proposed above, none of the cases accomplished their
and hence, all three were failures. In terms of the
definition, the ranking of the cases is as follows:6
STEPS
Deployment to the objective
Activities at the objective
Redeploymen t
BEST
Son Tay
Son Tay
Son Tay
TABLE I
2nd BES
Iran
Iran
Mayague
success and failure
primary objective
second part of the
IT 3rd BEST
Mayaguez
Mayaguez
!z Iran
These rankings were than consolidated into an overall ranking which
yielded: Son Tay - most successful (all three steps); Iran - 2nd most
successful (better than Mayaguez in two out of three steps); and Mayaguez
- 3rd most successful.
Problem Three
In this section the results of Chapter Three and the case-ranking
results above will be combined and analyzed, followed by a discussion of
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not detract from their hypothesized independence.) Second, note that
the variables are grouped from left to right according to the "high" to
"low" ratings that were assigned for each variable and in each case.
Third, the curve drawn on the Table outlines the apparent increase in
number of "high" performing variables as the degree of success of the
overall operation increases. It shows a very positive relationship be-
tween the increasing success and the identity and number of "high" rating
variables. Fourth, the box drawn around the variables and ratings high-
lights the variables which appear to be most sensitive to success and
failure. (Table III, next page).
First, consider the two variables to the right of the box, ASSESSMENT
and SPEED. They are apparent anomalies because they are inconsistent with
the pattern displayed in the table.
ASSESSMENT:
The importance of ASSESSMENT to the outcomes of these operations has
been well-established, at least subjectively, in the analysis of
Hypothesis I in Chapter III. The fact that all three cases had major
assessment problems, (i.e., none rated "high") may indicate that the poor
performance of assessment helps to explain why none of the cases fulfilled
the requirements of the mission to be called a first order success. (As
defined above, a first order success entails the successful rescue of
the prisoners/hostages.) In future studies which incorporate more cases
(indluding more successful ones) it is likely that the curve will continue
upwards through the assessment if the hypothesis is correct. The conclu-
sions therefore are: (1) the Guttman-type scaling used here has not
104
the conclusions.
Table II below is the result of a vertical rearrangement of the cases
and results of Table I according to the success ranking order derived in
this section above: Son Tay (Case One); Iran (Case Three); and
Mayaguez (Case Three).
THE HYPOTHESES AND ORDER OF SUCCESS
HI HII HIII HIV HV
a---b---c a----b----c a---b
+
SUCCESS
I.
CASE ONE L-0 L X X X X X X X X
CASE THREE 0 L X X 0 0 X L-O X X
CASE TWO L 0 L L L L L L X 0-X
FAILURE
TABLE II
The next table, Table III, reflects the rearrangement of the vari-
ables according to their ratings in each case. First; note that this
horizontal rearrangement is a manipulation of the hypotheses, only to the
extent that the variables which were discussed with the context of a
specific hypothesis are now separated and in a different order. The
names of the variables have been substituted for the letters. SPEED for
example is completely disassociated from SURPRISE and SECURITY. (Also,
recall that the association of the variables originally was an artificial
arrangement to facilitate the discussion and analysis and that it did
105
I
:rl C/
-'t
,aw '
"  
- M •aw
~C~X O(d
s~ · c-l
I
0
0
I
" IO
I I
I)
-L..-
1
I
I
I
I-
I
4
00 
Soo
z 2
0 H ' ',,
oo Ho Ho oO <- < 0WO 0 cD
S)_ U _
LI)
106
enabled the derivation of solid conclusions regarding ASSESSMENT; and (2)
future studies will likely confirm the applicability of that variable to
successful outcomes.
SPEED:
The essence of the variable is that success is critically dependent
upon "the degree to which existing or ad hoc organizations facilitate the
effective management of time constraints for organizing, planning, train-
ing, and executing the operation." The degree to which it played a criti-
cal part in the outcomes of these cases is not clear from this study.
SPEED appears to be very important however, based on the analysis in
Chapter Three. The addition of more cases to the study may also demon-
strate the role of SPEED relative to the outcomes.
In both of these variables, their inherent applicability and func-
tion was stated in the hypotheses and tested subjectively in the
analysis of each case, The fact that the results then did not confirm the
relevance of the variables is not to imply that they are irrelevant, On
the contrary, substantial support exists in the analysis in Chapter Three
for attention to the impact of these variables on planning, organizing,
training and conducting these operations - even though the relationship
has not been empirically demonstrated.
Next, consider the variables within the box. Two conclusions are
derived.
Conclusion One
As the degree of success of the cases increases the number of higher
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performing variables increases. This is what might logically be expected
if the correct variables are identified, and they are operative, in these
cases. The scaling effect shown by the curve seems to demonstrate that
there are important variables associated with success, and SURPRISE,
SECURITY, COMMUNICATIONS, COMMAND, CONTROL, and TRANSPORTATION are posi-
tively related to increasing success. However, no concrete conclusions
can be derived about the weights or relationships among the variables.
Nor can it be concluded that the variables constitute the sufficient con-
ditions for accounting for success. During the analysis in the third
chapter, several relationships were suggested and might form the basis for
further hypotheses information and testing. For example, SURPRISE and
SECURITY are very closely related and show a positive correlation.
Conclusion Two
If the "X" is viewed probabilistically as was suggested earlier, then
the variables assume a meaning in terms of the outcome which reflects the
effects of multiple probabilities. Assuming for example that in Son Tay
all ten variables explained the outcome, the expected probability of
success would be .51. (i.e., Ps = (.98)8*(.85)*(.7)) Viewed from hind-
sight this suggests that these operations are very risky even under the
best circumstances. There are so many potential unforeseen circumstances
that these operations reflect, at best, 50-50 odds. The implications
of this conclusion (perhaps it is really more like 60-40 in a really good
case), are obvious to the decision maker or planner. This author
would. conclude that: (a) the outcomes of these operations are very
sensitive to the performance of a single variable, and a lack of
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attention to any one drastically effects the outcome; and, (b) a hedge
against this .degradation problem is to build as much redundancy as is
reasonably possible into the operation (especially regarding equipment),
and to plan extensively for Murphy's Law effects. Planning for every con-
ceivable contingency is impossible, but there are means of simplifing
the problem. In an interview with LTC Robert Costa, an expert on special
forces and operations, he stated that there are literally hundreds of con-
tingencies which are prepared for in the course of intensive and special-
ized training of individuals and units.7 In Son Tay, the execution of
plan "Green" was very easy and simple because of the high state of train-
ing. Routine standard operating procedures and a "sharing of the mind"
of the participants through the unit training process minimize the impact
of contingencies. This realization is a strong argument for the prepara-
tion of an existing capability which would require only minor "tuning"
for the unique requirements of the impending operation.
Turning to the least successful case, could the probability of suc-
cess have been so low in the case of Mayaguez? (.98)*(.85)2*(.92)*(.65) 6
= .05. Did the Mayaguez have about a one in twenty chance of success?
Viewing the operation from hindsight and detailed knowledge, this author
would argue from a "tactical armchair" that the answer is "yes". The
poor assessment, planning and execution endangered the operation from che
.start. Helicopters are extremely vulnerable and need protection and sup-
port. There were very few helicopters, which made the time gap between
insertions of troops on the Island too wide. There was little or no
coordination for supporting fires. It is easy to be critical, and this
author is not an expert. But, the awareness of such a performance coupled
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with the denigrating effects of multiple probabilities, should encourage
decision makers and planners to look closely at the requirements for
success in these operations.
Lastly, consider the final conclusion, by looking to the left of the
box.
The scaling effect in the table along with the peculiarities of the
variables suggests that perhaps some of the variables are more control-
lable" than others. FORCE SELECTION and TRAINING are two variables over
which the decision makers, planners and trainers exercised a great deal of
control. The fact that these variables rated high (one medium to high
rating) supports the point. Even in the least successful case, the
variables performed well. One would also expect COMMAND, CONTROL and
COMMUNICATIONS by this reasoning to be better because they are more "con-
trollable"; but this is not the case according to the results in the table.
Perhaps the suggestion of controllability would be useful in a future,
more detailed study of the variables themselves with implications for
those concerned with these operations, Hypothesizing, for example, that
six of the ten variables are very controllable; two are somewhat control-
lable; and one is almost uncontrollable, a vertification of the hypothesis
would assist in several ways. It would aid in prioritizing time and
resources for addressing problems. The identification of variables into
these resources for addressing problems. The identification of variables
into these categories would assist the planners who (before a situation
arises) must design the organizations and procedures to overcome the pro-
blems associated with controllability. Finally, if this knowledge could
be combined with a knowledge of the weight of the variables, the informa-
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tion would be very useful in allocating resources.
In summary, this study was intended to attempt to discover if there
are common, causal forces which operate in combat rescue operations and
which contribute to success and failure. The method was to identify,
define, apply, and test the key variables, and to derive conclusions which
would be useful in future operations. The study was motivated by the
puzzling dearth of success the United States has enjoyed in over a hundred
years of trying. In all fairness, Admiral Holloway might have been right
when he remarked that "...perhaps this is so because we frequently attempt
the impossible..." 8 (where others fear to tread). However, the fact that
we attempt,(and will likely face the need in the future) to conduct these
operations suggests that we must prepare for them as best we can.
Many more questions were raised in this study than were answered.
But the effort was an initiating approach to cutting through the morass
and confusion of "horses and cows", and its value lies in its usefulness
for rejudging our efforts and decisions in expending lives and resources.
This study demonstrated in an empirical way that there are indeed
independent causal factors (variables) which operate across combat rescues.
Hopefully, by understanding their meanings, functions and relationships,
they can be more effectively managed to produce successful outcomes. The
spirit is articulated by a noted Statesman who said:
Tell the world that this is what happens
when you push the U.S. too far. This
mission [Iran] failed but next time we
will make it work.9
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FOOTNOTES
1. See for example, Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force With-
out War, The Brookings Institution, 1978. The nature of the defini-
tion problem was illustrated by Stephen M. Walt's cogent attack upon
it in "...A Critique of Force Without War", Center for Naval
Analyses, Professional Paper 279, May 1980.
2. See Hearings - Part I.
3. See the chronology in Head, especially.
4. See Rowan.
5. Gray Interview.
6. The application of the definitions to the cases is deliberately
omitted. The discussion is essentially a reorganization of many of
the facts presented in previous chapters. The only difficulty was
accounting for the indirect "claimed" impact of the Koh Tang assault
as a counter-intuitive case and refuting it, and addressing the
"complexity" issue regarding weighting the cases, which was done.
The relative case positions are relatively obvious. The degree and
frequency of problems with Mayaguez far exceeded the other two.
Conversely, Son Tay was far better than the other two. Iran falls
in the middle. Since none of the cases were first order successes,
this ranking logic should support the conclusion.
7. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Costa, USA, expert on
Special Forces and special operations. (J-3, Operations, Pentagon)
March, 1981.
8. Holloway Interview.
9. Henry Kissinger, quoted in Time, May 5, 1980.
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